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In the present thesis we discuss one of the most famous topics in the literature on mutual funds 
performances: do fund managers really deserve their fees? Our focus is exclusively on the top performing 
funds which invested in S&P 500 stocks in the period from March 31st 1999 to December 31st 2019. Our 
goal is to determine if at least the most successful managers, belonging to the 1% highest percentile of 
the distribution of 5001 different funds, have measurable skills that can benefit the investors after 
adjusting the performance for the risk and the operational expenses. In order to perform our analysis, we 
employed a technique called Return-Based Style Analysis that helped us in the determination of the 
portfolio style of each manager. Afterwards, we reported the Alpha returns that they achieve, calculated 
as the difference between their performance and the reference benchmark and representative of the 
manager’s contribution to the results. In conclusion, we estimate if the Alphas, also known as active 
returns, are driven by the exposure to factors or should be reconducted to the skills of the managers.  
Our study is part of the line of research that follows the findings of Fama and French (2010), who show 
that the largest majority of mutual fund managers have a negative or statistically not significant impact 
on returns. Only a small subgroup of managers, belonging to the high tail of the distribution of returns, 
is deemed able to achieve positive extra returns over the benchmark and to transfer them to the investors.  
The originality of our approach is to focus only on the top 1% of the universe of managers, discarding 
all the other managers who didn’t perform as well as them. We use traditional tools, like factor investing 
and RBSA, blending them together to determine whether, at least the top 1% of the managers show actual 
skills. This small subset has not been deeply analyzed yet by other researchers, who instead focused on 
larger groups of managers without a-priori selection: conclusions have never been directly drawn to the 
top 1%, but only the majority of the managers. 
We estimate this extra return at an average of 3.98% among the subset of skilled managers and our 
analysis aims at drawing a clearer and more detailed picture on this talented subgroup. The results of our 
research confirms that there is only a fraction among the high-performing managers with significant 
skills that should be compensated with appropriate fees. In our sample of 30 funds meeting all the 
selection constraints that we have imposed, the fraction of skilled managers is 60%, meaning that our 
estimation is that only 0.60% of the universe managers is able to generate significant extra returns. The 
remaining managers, instead, didn’t achieve Alphas which were significantly different from zero, 
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showing that these managers didn’t add a relevant contribution to the performance and, based on our 
definition, are not skilled enough to deserve their compensation. 
Another relevant aspect investigated in the thesis is linked to the investment style of the analyzed mutual 
fund managers, measured with the tools of factor investing. We discuss the persistence of the risk 
premiums connected to the exposure to the six factors (Size, Low Volatility, High Quality, Momentum, 
Dividend Yield and Value), especially in relation to the recent diffusion of Smart Beta funds.  
The research is structured in five chapters and each of them is focused on a specific aspect of the analysis. 
In the first chapter we describe the main framework of the paper and review the literature pertaining to 
our study. The focus is on the dichotomy between active and passive funds and the introduction of Smart 
Beta funds as an alternative with characteristics in common with both types of funds. We discuss 
previous models and research assessing the performance of mutual fund managers and the differences 
among them. We also introduce the setting and tools used in the following chapters.  
We begin chapter 2 with an in-depth analysis of the six factors, their discovery and the explanation of 
their risk premiums. Furthermore, we describe the ongoing debate among academics and practitioners 
on the persistence of the factors, together with different theories suggesting the existence of other 
additional factors. The six factors represent the basis in the construction of the six indexes of chapter 3, 
which includes also a detailed assessment of their performance in relation to the S&P 500 benchmark.  
Additionally, in chapter 3 we explain the rules in the selection of the stocks in the construction of our 
customized indexes, the weighting criteria and the rebalancing constraints. Furthermore, we compare 
and comment on the performance of the indexes, both relative to the S&P 500 and among themselves. 
The results reported are consistent with the major studies on factor premiums and factor investing.  
The following chapter includes the main findings of the analysis and starts with a detailed explanation 
of the technique (RSBA) and the list of all the constraints in the selection of the pool of managers. We 
develop a step by step description of the model used in the multiple variable regression and determine 
the investment style of fund managers. We evaluate their skills by calculating the R2 coefficient, whose 
complement to one represents the share of the variance of the performance not explained by the factors. 
We measure the performance of the managers by calculating their Alpha return over customized style 
portfolios and we conduct T-tests on the significance of the results. Our analysis shows that among the 
most successful managers a relevant portion of them - 18 out of 30 - deserve their compensation fees and 




what could distort our analysis, such as statistical biases and luck component in the excess returns. In the 
end, we compare our results to those of other researchers.  
The fifth and last chapter expands our focus on Smart Beta funds, highlighting the main concerns 
regarding the persistence of the risk premiums of factors and mentioning the new specific risks pertaining 
to factor investing. Furthermore, we review some studies attempting to identify skillful managers based 
on their personal background, without relying on their past performance. We include the description of 
two common statistical biases (the selection and the survivor biases), their effects and the relative 
corrections. Finally, we conclude remarking the relevance of the fee structure of the funds on the 
investors’ investment decisions, showing that, based on the results of our paper, retail investors would 
be better off allocating most of their money to passive funds and a small share to Smart Beta strategies. 
On the other hand, institutional investors with appropriate resources and capable of determining if a 
manager is skillful or not, should include active funds in their holdings too.  
In the last section we summarize the conclusions of our thesis and indicate some suggestions for further 
research, like an alternative managers’ selection process and the inclusion of other factors in the style 






Chapter 1 - The Main Framework 
1.1    Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the main concepts and framework that will be developed in the thesis. We 
review the most relevant literature on our topics and discuss the implications for our work. We begin 
from the characteristics and the main distinctions between the two management styles that can be 
observed in most mutual funds in the world: active or passive management. We consider the benefits and 
drawbacks for the investors of both types of funds, setting the framework for the principal question of 
the paper: do the most successful active managers deserve their fees?  
We briefly introduce the methodology in the selection of the mutual fund managers, who are chosen 
among the best of their category1, and how the analysis will be developed in the determination of their 
skills. The approach, called Returns-Based Style Analysis (RBSA) is concisely outlined with its 
advantages and inner limitations. 
In the description of RBSA, we pose great attention on the construction of factor style indexes to create 
the appropriate benchmark for each one of the 30 mutual funds under examination. We review the 
literature and previous researches on performance measurement, Total Alpha Return, style factors and 
factor investing, presenting the six most famous factors and describing how we employ them in the 
analysis. In conclusion, we recall the recent growth of funds whose strategies are based on factor 
investing, the so called “Smart Beta Funds.” 
1.2    Active Versus Passive Management 
When it comes to deciding where to invest their money, investors have to make a choice between two 
main categories of funds: active or passive portfolio managed funds. There are many differences between 
the two, highlighting two completely opposite views on the markets and their functioning. In our paper 
we do not include bond funds or funds investing both in stocks and bonds, both just mutual funds with 
stocks and cash as holdings. 
First of all, active managers try to outperform a reference benchmark by taking active positions in the 
market and expressing their views, selling or buying securities based on their forecasts. On the other 
hand, passive managed portfolios have the goal to replicate the performance of the selected benchmark 
 
1 Identified in the “high tail of the distribution of managers’ returns”, as analyzed by Fama and French (2010). 
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as closely as possible, without assigning different weights to the securities in the portfolio construction 
with respect to the benchmark allocation2. No active position is taken by the passive managers, implying 
that their portfolio composition mimics the weights assigned to the securities of the reference index. 
Passive portfolios are, for example, index portfolios, as well as most Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). 
Their goal is to replicate the performance of the market, of another reference index or of a set of indexes. 
Passive equity mutual funds were less common than active equity mutual funds, but their share in the 
market has increased during the past years to the point that the assets under management are the same as 
active equity mutual funds.3 In our entire work we are always considering US mutual funds, since the 
US market is the most developed in the world and investors have the chance to invest in a wide set of 
companies. 
Passive investors usually face low fees and expenses, because the managers are not requested to beat the 
market and achieve an extra-return, but they only need to follow the market performance as closely as 
possible. The expected return of a passive mutual fund is reflected by the performance of the market, less 
the small costs that the managers face, such as rebalancing and transaction costs. The net return adjusted 
for fees will then decrease a bit more depending on the annual management fees4.  
Active investors, instead, set their goal at outperforming the reference benchmark. Their holdings differ 
from the index because they look for higher returns, buying and selling securities that they deem as 
undervalued or overvalued. The performance of these funds depends on how they allocate their 
endowment among the asset classes and how they implement the security selection. Their ability is 
reflected into the returns that they achieve.  
In our paper we try to determine if active managers have substantial skills and if they are the true 
determinant in achieving superior returns, or if their results can be simply explained by the historical 
premiums recorded by the so-called “style factors,” which will be introduced in chapter 2. Active 
managed funds usually have higher turnover ratios5 than passive funds, since the managers need to adjust 
their position more often, depending on their expectations of the market. Subsequently, active funds incur 
in higher transaction and rebalancing costs due to the larger number of trades with respect to passive 
investing. The costs connected to active mutual funds management are higher, in a range between 0.5% 
and 1%, occasionally up to 3% (Morningstar, 2019). Furthermore, an additional cost which, in general, 
 
2 Passive managers have the mandate to track the benchmark, maintaining the portfolio allocation as close as possible to 
the index and reducing deviations from it. 
3 The growth of passive funds has been particularly fast after the Financial Crisis. (Bloomberg, September 2019) 
4 Management fees vary among funds, but the average in 2019 for passive mutual funds is about 0.2%. 




is not taken into consideration is the taxation of capital gains when a trade is closed. On the other hand, 
passive investors, who buy and hold securities for a long time, can benefit from lower taxation costs and, 
sometimes can benefit from tax reductions too if they satisfy country-specific regulations on holding 
periods. 
Our goal is to determine if the skills that the managers use in their activity in the market are backed by 
statistically significant returns, after accounting for the risk that they undertake. The risk is measured by 
the volatility of the returns and, in order to compare the results of different managers, we calculate the 
Sharpe Ratio, also known as risk-to-reward ratio. The prevailing literature is pretty much aligned: active 
fund managers have traditionally underperformed passive indexes, excluding short periods. In particular, 
Fama and French (2010) prove in their analysis that only “few active managers can cover their costs” 
and can guarantee an extra return above the market to their investors. In order to address this specific 
and small subgroup of managers in our analysis, we set strict criteria to select only the managers that 
have performed far better than their peers and also with respect to their reference index (S&P 500 Index) 
from March 31st 1999 to December 31st 2019.  
Active portfolio managers try to maximize the value that they add to their clients by using their skills in 
discerning how to undertake risk in order to achieve a higher return. The risk that they focus on is called 
“active risk,” which is the risk measured outside the benchmark. In fact, the performance of the 
benchmark is not under the managers’ control, who can instead show their skills deviating from the 
returns of S&P 500.  
Managers can then make a difference in two ways: timing the benchmark6 and selecting the best 
securities7. The first strategy is followed by managers who assign different weight allocations to the 
index sectors with respect to the benchmark, while the second entails the identification and selection of 
single stocks that outperform or underperform the market. We measure the aggregate ability of the 
managers in our analysis, after identifying the components that better reflect their investment style.  
The past literature on active portfolio management offers many approaches to the implementation of the 
managers’ strategies, such as Black and Litterman (1992) who suggest that the managers add value by 
expressing their views on the market and by optimizing the asset classes weights following their 
expectations. Grinold and Kahn (1995), instead, determine that the managers add value to the portfolio 
 
6 This strategy goes under the name of “Active Beta” in finance. 
7 Traditionally referred to as stock picking. 
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by forecasting Alphas of the available securities, which are defined as the extra returns over the market 
return. 
Summing up, investors face the alternative choice between active and passive management when they 
decide where to invest their money and, in both cases, they have advantages and drawbacks. The biggest 
advantage of active investing is that the managers can express their views without being forced to allocate 
their assets like in the reference index. On the other side, active managers can make bad decisions and 
the returns might be poor or even below the market, in addition to the higher operational expenses and 
management fees.  
Our focus is to determine if at least the most successful active managers have skills significant enough 
to be rightfully compensated with the fees that they collect. As a consequence, it would be also 
worthwhile for an investor to assign her money to active managers instead of depositing her savings in 
the alternative represented by passive mutual funds.  
In the next paragraph we review some research on this topic, showing how, on average, active managers 
have underperformed their reference indexes. 
1.3    Active Managers and Total Alpha Returns 
As previously mentioned, our main reference is Fama and French’s paper (2010). In their work, the two 
economists evaluate whether, after subtracting the management costs, the returns achieved by mutual 
fund managers add value to their clients at a significant degree of confidence.  
Their findings are that “few funds produce benchmark-adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their 
costs” and that “evidence of inferior and superior performance (nonzero true alpha)” is observed only 
“in the extreme tails of the cross-section of mutual fund alpha estimates” (Fama and French, 2010). This 
implies that only a small subgroup of the mutual fund managers that the authors analyze show results 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers can generate superior returns with their abilities. 
Furthermore, there is a small group of managers who significantly underperform the benchmark. The 
researchers calculate Alpha, known as abnormal expected return, to determine the outperformance of the 
managers over their benchmark.  
These are the main similarities between our analysis and the work of Fama and French (2010), which 
provides us with the overall conceptual framework to set up our analysis. However, our focus is more 




researchers suggest that “some managers do have sufficient skill to cover costs,” instead of choosing the 
average manager as standard reference. 
Fama and French (2010) employ both the Three Factor Model that they developed in 1992 and the Four 
Factor Model implemented by Carhart (1997). The variables of the time-series regression are the 
following: the market return, adjusted for the risk-free rate, the size and value factors, with the addition 
of the momentum factor adapted from Carhart’s paper.  
Our analysis, instead, implements six style factors and is based on the Returns-Based Style Analysis 
technique introduced by Sharpe (1988), generating fund-specific benchmarks to mirror the performance 
of mutual funds and to identify the relative Total Alpha Returns not captured by the style factors of the 
regressions.  
Ang (2014) describes Alpha as a measurement tool of the skills of a manager that, with her abilities, 
generates a return higher than the benchmark. The author explains that, since Alpha represents the 
“average return in excess of a benchmark,” also known as active return, “the benchmark is passive and 
can be produced without any particular investment knowledge or even human intervention.” It is 
straightforward that, if a manager doesn’t produce significant active returns, she would only be a net cost 
for the clients. The return adjusted for the fees would be lower than the return potentially achieved in a 
passive fund of comparable style, making the investors better off without the presence of the mutual fund 
manager.  
Furthermore, Ang (2014) states that “Alpha by itself could be produced by a manager taking large 
amounts of risk,” so it is not informative enough by itself. He suggests adjusting Alpha for its risk, 
dividing it by the tracking error, which is calculated as the standard deviation of the excess returns8. The 
ratio that he obtains is known as Information Ratio and it measures the performance of an investment 
with respect to the benchmark, after adjusting for its additional risk.  
Ang (2014) reports that “Information ratios above one are not common - although many hedge funds 
trying to raise money claim to have them” and mentions that “since the financial crisis, information ratios 
on many funds and strategies have come down substantially.” Grinold and Kahn (1995) estimate the 
average Information Ratio of the top 25% of fund managers at around one half. In our analysis, given 
that each benchmark is specifically tailored for each mutual fund on the basis of the results of the RBSA, 
 
8 It is also denominated “active risk”, since it is the additional risk added by the manager’s choices. 
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the most appropriate procedure to assess the manager’s skills is to calculate the T-statistics, instead of 
other ratios that do not take into account the significance of the results, such as the Information Ratio9.  
The key aspect of the analysis is that managers can only generate Alphas with their abilities in making 
bets that deviate their holdings from the weights assigned to the securities in the benchmarks. As Ang 
(2014) support of the results of the T-tests, we can determine whether the selected mutual fund managers 
have substantial skills and deserve their fees.  
Reviewing other studies on the determination of managers’ skills, the results are consistent with the 
findings of Fama and French (2010). The SPIVA US Study conducted by S&P (2014) establishes that, 
on average, the percentage of mutual funds unable to beat the benchmark10 ranges between 61% and 89% 
based on 1, 5 and 10 year periods before 2014. The same conclusions are reached in research by Arthveda 
Capital (2015) in which the amount of funds underperforming the benchmark is around 80% for the same 
period. Also Sebastian and Attaluri (2016) show that, referring to strategies focused on the traditional 
factors of rules-based investing, no statistically significant Alpha is found when confronted with a T-
statistic of 2.011 and accounting for the Value and Size factors. 
In our analysis we account for the style strategies implemented by the managers, isolating the Total 
Alpha Return with the statistical methodology that is introduced in the next paragraph. 
1.4    The Main Framework 
After reviewing the most relevant literature pertaining to our paper, we develop the main framework that 
is implemented in the next chapters. We follow the methodology introduced by Sharpe (1988), analyzing 
the 30 mutual funds that we select among the 5001 reported by Bloomberg. 
First of all, we build six indexes based on the following six factors: Size, High Quality, Low Volatility, 
Value, Dividend Yield and Momentum. These six factors have been recognized by most researchers as 
the drivers of historical premiums in the explanation of market returns. Given our goal in determining 
the effective skills of mutual fund managers, we need to distinguish if the returns achieved can be 
explained just by the six factors premiums or if a component of skills is significantly present. The indexes 
are built following what academia has considered as the key identifiers for each factor, discussed in 
chapter 3. We decide to build customized indexes and not to rely on those available in the financial 
 
9 Furthermore, we would have to consider the same benchmark across the funds to make proper comparisons. 
10 In this study the common benchmark is the S&P 500. 




markets, such as MSCI Factor Indexes12, because the most tailored they are, the more precise and 
accurate the regression would be.  
The Returns-Based Style Analysis provides all the necessary information for a first snapshot of the 
manager’s skills, which are further investigated to fully understand what are the true determinants and if 
there can be any statistical inaccuracy or luck component that might be responsible for distortions in the 
results.  
Crucial to our analysis is a proper a-priori selection of the managers. We impose strict criteria on the 
selection, in order to choose those few managers that are considered skillful by Fama and French (2010) 
and belong to the highest tail of the distribution of managers’ returns. We include additional constraints 
on the analysis to create benchmark portfolios that are realistic and can appropriately determine what is 
the style that each manager adopts in her investment portfolio13.  
The main question of the paper is addressed by the calculation of the Total Alpha Return14: if the value 
is statistically significant, the manager deserves her fees and is able to grant her clients a superior return 
adjusted for her management expenses. Further details are discussed in the relative paragraphs.  
1.5    Style Factors and Their Implementation 
One of the key steps of our analysis is the identification and construction of style indexes based on 
factors. We now describe what factors are and review the most important literature on this topic.  
Factors are defined as “investment styles that deliver high returns over the long run” by Ang (2014). The 
author states that each factor, since “risk premiums don’t come for free, can underperform in the short 
run” and this “can occur especially in periods of economic recession.” The traditional and first example 
of a factor is the exposure to market risk, which explains the extra returns of stocks over the risk-free 
rate: it was described for the first time by Sharpe (1964) in the introduction of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model. This factor is defined as “static,” since it is linked to simple long-only positions15 and investors 
are rewarded for the exposure to the risks of the market.  
Other factors, instead, are linked to different risk premiums, such as value, growth, momentum and 
volatility, which generally offered extra returns to investors exposed to the connected risks (Ang, 2014). 
 
12 MSCI Inc. is the global provider of many stock indexes and the leader in factor indexing. 
13 It is important to use indexes that can be potentially invested by managers, since the goal is to be close to reality and not 
just finding statistical relationships that are not realistic in the financial environment. 
14 Defined as the return over the customized benchmark. 
15 This is the factor typically rewarded in a buy-and-hold strategy. 
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Factors with characteristics similar to those of the latter group are defined as “dynamic,” since they are 
often implemented with long-short strategies by investors, who try to identify and buy the most promising 
stocks while they open short positions on poor-performing assets.16 
Every factor premium is, in fact, connected to the exposure to a specific kind of risk that investors face 
by following factor-based strategies (Ang, 2014). Assets are inherently made of different types of factors 
and, based on the investors’ security selection, they create the style of the investment portfolio.  
The determination of the investment style of each manager is fundamental in the decomposition of the 
returns, since it allows us to define the proper benchmark in the calculation of the Total Alpha Return17. 
This is also the best approach to track the exposure to factors of each manager, which relies upon the 
determination of their style and the identification of an appropriate reference benchmark.  
Furthermore, the traditional measures of volatility are based on the standard deviation of the total returns 
but, in performance measurement, it is more accurate to use the active risk only, which is the volatility 
of Alpha over the reference period. Active risk and active return are the two key measures in the 
calculation of the value added by the manager’s abilities and views in the market. 
Other researchers implemented similar analysis, focusing on specific funds or on a pool of funds, finding 
concordant results: Brinson (1986) determined that in his pool of funds almost 90% of the variance of 
the returns was explained by style factors, leaving very small room for the managers’ skills.  
There are many ways to invest in the dynamic factors that we consider, including long-only and long-
short positions, with the investor buying, for example, Value stocks and selling Growth stocks. Each 
fund has a specific benchmark and activity, based on its clients’ mandate, and its performance must be 
tracked by an appropriate benchmark.  
Other models, like the Arbitrage Portfolio Theory (APT), do not focus on style factors, but on 
macroeconomic determinants such as inflation, GDP growth, investors’ confidence and the yield curve.18 
APT was introduced by the economist Stephen Ross (1976) as an asset pricing theory that could explain 
the return of assets depending on factors coming from macroeconomics and depending on the sensitivity 
of each asset to the aforementioned factors. 
 
16 Most funds can only open limited short positions, resulting in a final exposure that is almost always on the long side of 
the market. 
17 In the paper when we mention Alpha, we always refer to the Total Alpha Return, except when we define the variables of 
the regression. 




Another model, named Barra Risk Factor Model after the firm which developed its framework in 1998, 
employs over 40 different metrics, ranging from earnings data to debt quality, to determine the factor 
risk exposure of a certain security and consequently assessing its potential return and risk. This last 
model, like all the others, is based on the risk-return tradeoff and uses the concept of factors in the 
determination of the peculiar characteristics of the investments.  
Additional improvements in the determination of the style factors come from S. Thomas (2010), who 
“extends RBSA to form style groups using cluster analysis,” resulting in a closer monitoring of the 
changes in the portfolio style throughout the life of mutual funds. In his analysis he also invents an index, 
named “Best Fit Index,” to evaluate which style mix can better replicate and explain the performance of 
mutual fund managers. His results confirm the relevance of RBSA by “explaining a significant 
proportion of the cross section of out of sample returns.” (Thomas, 2010) 
On the other hand, some critics address the results reported in these studies by indicating inconsistencies 
in the approach and in its principles, citing the Efficient Market Hypothesis. In its strong form, it states 
that “current stock prices fully reflect available information about the value of the firm, and there is no 
way to earn excess profits by using this information” (Fama, 1964). This means that, if the strong form 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis Most is valid, beating the market is impossible and there is no room 
for managers’ skills. On the other hand, if the hypothesis doesn’t hold in the strong form, there are 
chances for managers to make an impact and add significant value with their activity.  
One of the most famous supporters of the strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, B. Malkiel, 
finds evidence in his studies that managers do not have substantial skills when they build their strategies 
on technical or fundamental analysis on public information (Malkiel, 2016). However, he also writes that 
“few mutual funds managers can be able to consistently outperform the market over the long term,” but 
it is “statistically unlikely for an investor to select one of those few funds.” (Malkiel, 2016)19 
During the course of the years, however, most researchers suggest that there is some sort of market 
inefficiency which can be exploited by skillful investors (Rosenberg, 1985), leading the economists to 
define the factors explaining the extra returns. The relevant contributions will be discussed in the next 
chapter, together with a detailed explanation of the premiums of each factor and the relative explanation. 
Outside of the academic environment, a very relevant pattern has emerged during the last two decades, 
with the rise of factor investing in the form of open-ended mutual funds and ETFs20, accessible to the 
 
19 The first edition of the Malkiel’s research dates back to 1973, with the last update in 2016. 
20 Exchange Traded Funds. They are passive and low-cost funds traded on stock exchanges. 
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great majority of investors. Their strategy is based on a mix between a passive and an active strategy 
using factors, which is the topic of the next paragraph.  
1.6    Factor Investing and the Rise of Smart Beta Funds 
Factor investing is defined as an investment strategy which is based on the exposure to preselected factors 
and “typically focuses on capturing factor premiums that have been extensively documented in the lit-
erature, such as the value, momentum, and low volatility premiums.” (Blitz, 2016). During the last years, 
“asset allocators increasingly consider factor premiums next to traditional asset class risk premiums” 
(Blitz, 2016) focusing mostly on long-only strategies. From a theoretical standpoint, the best way to 
capture the risk premiums connected to the factors is to pursue a long-short strategy in which the stocks 
are bought or sold depending on their factor exposure. This strategy captures a pure risk premium, 
isolating it from other influences21 and generating a very low level of correlation with the market itself 
(Blitz, 2016). However, a long-short approach is not available to most mutual fund managers, given the 
constraints that they face in the management of their endowments.  
Factor investing is a recent trend whose rise is a direct consequence of the introduction of Smart Beta 
Indexes, capable of reproducing the performance connected to the exposure to one or to multiple factors 
by following specific rules in the construction and rebalancing methodology22. Smart Beta Indexes 
employ “mechanical rules to deviate from capitalization-weighted market indexes, resulting in 
systematic tilts toward certain factors” (Blitz, 2016) and effectively capture “value that can be attributed 
entirely to exposures to established factor premiums.” (Chow, 2011) 
Smart Beta Indexes and portfolios can be considered a blend between passive and active investment 
styles, overcoming the traditional distinction between the two and offering a product that presents some 
of the peculiar traits of both strategies. They “offer the benefits of passive strategies combined with some 
of the advantages of active ones, placing it at the intersection of efficient-market hypothesis and factor 
investing.” (Stewart, 2017) Smart Beta Indexes, also known as Factor Indexes, are in fact built based on 
the definition of the factor they are supposed to track, generating their exposure on the basis of financial 
indicators that identify the factors in the available stocks.  
 
21 Such as the market return, for example. 





On the other hand, these indexes also have characteristics of passive indexes, which rely on the concept 
that asset prices already incorporate all public information, hence there are no arbitrage opportunities 
available for active investors as expressed by the Efficient Market Hypothesis23.  
Furthermore, most Smart Beta indexes are simple and transparent, without convoluted mechanism in the 
selection of the securities. Additionally, the low turnover, which measures how often the indexes change 
their composition, is typical of passive portfolios, while active managers are characterized by higher 
turnover ratios. Actively managed portfolios sometimes have turnover ratios exceeding 100%, while in 
the case of passive portfolios the ratio can be as low as 3% (Morningstar). 
On the other hand, Smart Beta strategies have also characteristics traditionally attributed to active 
portfolios, such as the potential for outperformance. It is measured by the risk-reward ratio, expressing 
how investors can achieve higher returns or lower their risk without affecting the risk-adjusted 
performance. Alford (2016) shows that the superior return can be recorded by Smart Beta indexes 
because they are “tilt toward common equity factors attempting to exploit the inefficiencies of market 
cap-weighted portfolios,” which instead “overweight stocks that are overvalued and underweight stocks 
that are undervalued.” Subsequently, cap-weighted portfolios “may not provide the maximum return per 
unit of risk.” 
Smart Beta strategies are not a new product of the financial industry, since researchers have identified 
the first factors risk premiums almost 50 years ago and they have been available for investors for decades. 
However, only active managers with very relaxed mandates, such as hedge funds, were able to exploit 
factor-based strategies, since the deviation from the benchmark and the connected active risk would have 
been too large for mutual funds. Alford (2016) explains that “what is new is the way that investors can 
access these common equity factors,” without relying on the skills of active managers in identifying the 
best stocks but just “getting exposure to common equity factors using simple and transparent 
approaches.” Furthermore, Smart Beta funds follow a low-cost strategy that make them very attractive 
to investors. 
Consistent with these premises, Smart Beta funds and factor investing have increased their popularity in 
the last decade, with compounded growth rates above 20% per year during the period 2011-2016, when 
assets invested in Factor-Based Exchange Traded Funds went from $ 150 billion to over $ 450 billion 
(Morningstar). The growth pattern continued steadily until 2019 too, with a total amount of $ 880 billion 
 
23 Insider information, however, is still relevant and linked to arbitrage opportunities. 
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invested in Factor-Based ETFs. The amount does not include those mutual and hedge funds which are 
partly or fully implementing factor-like strategies in their management, because they normally change 
their approach too often and fall under the classification of “dynamic asset allocation” (Bloomberg). The 
amount invested is still small with respect to the total allocation to active equity funds ($ 4.2 trillion) and 
passive equity funds ($ 4.3 trillion), since investors, overall, prefer to stick to traditional rather than 
alternative investment like Factor-Based ETFs.24 
The increase of the assets under management of Factor-Based funds and the popularity of Smart Beta 
strategies raise different concerns among investors. For example, many practitioners question the 
persistence of the risk premiums linked to the factors (Bender, 2013) and the risks connected to the 
implementation of a relatively new strategy in the traditional portfolio management practices. The main 
concerns are closely connected to the increasing size of the investments in funds with specific factor 
exposure, which can halt the risk premiums historically awarded to those factors.  
We address this and other potential weaknesses of Smart Beta strategies in chapter 5, together with their 
likely evolution in the future as more Factor-Based funds are created and more sophisticated techniques 
are developed to identify and select the most exposed stocks.  
In the next chapter we evaluate and explain the historical premiums awarded to the six most famous 
factors; Size, High Quality, Momentum, Value, Low Volatility and Dividend Yield. We discuss their 
consistency and persistence over the years, always in light of the researches made both by practitioners 
and academics.  
 






Chapter 2 - The Six Factors 
2.1    Introduction 
In the present chapter we review the literature on the six factors investigated in our paper: Size, Value, 
Momentum, High Quality, Low Volatility and Dividend Yield. They are the most common factors and 
the great majority of researchers agree that they are awarded with consistent and persistent risk 
premiums. 
We explain the economic reasons that can justify these risk premiums, starting back from their discovery 
in the financial markets. Having a clear and deep understanding of the functioning of the factors is 
extremely important because they represent the basis to build our indexes.  
In the last section we also discuss additional factors that have been identified by researchers but are not 
included in the regression, mostly because they would have been redundant or because their stability is 
still under debate among academics and practitioners.  
2.2    Size Factor Premium: Small Vs Large 
The Size factor expresses the risk premium awarded to small cap stocks with respect to large caps. It is 
the simplest factor among all and is identified by the market capitalization of the companies under 
examination. The factor is described for the first time in 1981 by R. Banz, who finds that “smaller firms 
have had higher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms.” The effect identified by Banz was 
present for at least forty years and was more relevant for very small firms in NYSE. The author also 
states that “it is not known whether size per se is responsible for the effect of is just a proxy for one or 
more true unknown factors correlated with size.” (Banz, 1981) 
More than 10 years later, Fama and French (1992) published their famous Three Factor Model, in which 
they add the Size and Value factors to the Market factor25. They suggest that the risk premium is based 
on many reasons, such as the limited investability in small firms for many funds, which leads to less 
usage of public information and leaves mispricing opportunities open for other investors able to capitalize 
on them. Small companies are also riskier, overall, than large corporations, so a great number of investors 
prefer to stay away from them, even if the historical returns, adjusted for their volatility, are higher.  
 




The debate over the persistence of this factor has increased across the years, with some researchers stating 
that the Size factor is not recording anymore a substantial premium over the benchmark index. In 
particular, Beck (2016), highlights that in most researches the size factor has delivered an extraordinary 
risk premium simply due to the selection process of “small cap stocks, which are subject to the delisting 
return bias.” This bias brings the attention to one of the common problems with the exploration of past 
performances given a specific factor: if a company is delisted, the return is usually not accounted in the 
calculations. In Beck’s opinion, this procedure generally leads to recording higher premiums than what 
they really are.  
The growing implementation of the Size factor among practitioners has probably shrunk the associated 
extra return, due to the phenomenon called “crowding” (Alford, 2016), which explains the progressive 
decline of premiums depending on the number of investors following that particular strategy. On the 
other hand, MSCI (2016) shows that the Size factor has achieved significant returns both in the United 
States and in the rest of the world, continuing to outperform the market especially in periods of sharp 
rise26.  
Overall, the size effect exacerbates the magnitude of the swings of the market and generates large returns 
with its upward potential, following the main cycles of the market. 
2.3    Momentum Factor Premium: Winners Vs Losers 
The Momentum factor captures the premium awarded to strategies that rely on buying past winners and 
selling past losers. A stock is defined as “winner” when its previous 6 or 12-month return is above the 
average of the market, while a “loser” is a past underperformer. The Momentum factor is based on a 
strong persistence of the price pattern of stocks, fully relying on past performance as the unique tool to 
define the stocks to buy and to sell.  
The first researchers identified this relationship in 1993 and, trying to find the determinants of the risk 
premium, they found that the profitability of Momentum-based strategies is not directly linked to the 
exposure to systematic risks or to slow stock price response to common factors (Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993). They conclude that the above-the-average return seem to be only linked to the previous 
performance which, however, partially disappears in the next two years. The time span considered to 
select Momentum stocks ranges from 3 months to 1 year. 
 
26 As with every factor, there is an abundance of papers supporting both its existence and the contrary. In every case, the 
predominant view is that all the six factors are present in the market. 
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Since its discovery, the Momentum factor has been incorporated in Carhart’s extension of the Three 
Factor Model in 1997, named Four Factor Model. In his paper the author removes the survivor bias from 
his sample and demonstrates that the persistence of equity mutual funds’ risk-adjusted returns can be 
almost entirely explained by the presence of common elements in investment expenses and stock returns. 
He refines Jegadeesh’s results by showing that “funds that earn higher one-year returns do so not because 
fund managers successfully follow momentum strategies, but because some mutual funds just happen by 
chance to hold relatively larger positions in last year’s winning stocks.” (Carhart, 1997)27 He concludes 
that managers do not have substantial skills and the overperformance must be awarded to the Momentum 
and the other style factors. He also adds that the high transaction expenses of most active mutual funds 
reduces momentum-related returns by a relevant amount. 
Other researchers confirm the persistence of the Momentum factor, highlighting that it has been one of 
the factors with the most consistent excess returns over the years (MSCI, 2016), as long as the indexes 
are built as self-financing portfolios. We define a self-financing portfolio as a portfolio that doesn’t need 
capital from the investors28, since the amount of stocks bought are financed by the value of stocks sold. 
Nevertheless, this kind of strategy is not viable for mutual fund managers, given their strict leverage 
constraints. On the other hand, some hedge funds can follow this zero-weight strategy and reap returns 
both on the long and short side of the market, gaining full exposure to the momentum factor.  
MSCI (2016) shows that the Momentum factor has generally reported a better performance when the 
“macroeconomic environment is characterized by a long cycle in underlying market trends,” while 
instead it suffers from sudden reversal in market trends and during recessions. The major risk for 
investors is to buy a stock around its peak, just before a mean reversion trend begins, erasing most of 
gains from the previous period.  
2.4    Value Factor Premium: Value Vs Growth 
The Value factor captures the risk premium awarded to cheap stocks with respect to more pricey stocks. 
The definition of “cheap” and “pricey” stocks relates to the most famous multiples in the analysis of 
common stocks, Price/Earnings (P/E) and Price/Book (P/B). When the multiples are low, the stocks are 
defined as “Value stocks,” otherwise they are classified as “Growth stocks.” The former are expected to 
 
27 Carhart’s main point is that the Momentum factor exists but managers don’t add value to the security selection. 




outperform the market since they are relatively underpriced and investors expect them to converge to 
their estimated value, while the latter trade at high multiples for their future potential. 
The Value effect has been documented by Basu (1982), who examines stocks belonging to the NYSE 
and determines that “the Value effect is clearly significant even if experimental control is exercised over 
differences in firm size.” His analysis only relies on the empirical relationship between returns and 
earnings yield, measured by the ratio of earnings over price (E/P)29. However, he states that the effects 
of Size and Value factors are much more complicated and interconnected that what former studies 
indicated30. 
The Value factor has been extensively documented since Basu’s paper. Furthermore, it is also included 
in Fama and French’s Three Factor Model (1992). However, its persistence is a matter of debate among 
academics, since during certain periods Growth stocks performed much better than Value stocks. In 
particular during the 90’s, while the Internet bubble was growing the Value effect was not in place 
anymore, returning after the bursting of the bubble in 2000’s (Al Root, 2020).  
Further MSCI research (2016) address the main weaknesses in the proper identification of the factor, for 
example excluding temporary increases or drops in earnings by taking into consideration Forward 
Adjusted Earnings instead of Current Earnings.  
An additional improvement included by MSCI in its Value Index is the substitution of the traditional 
market capitalization as price indicator with the enterprise value, which calculates also the debt held by 
a company. Doing so, highly leveraged firms are ruled out of the selection and the estimates are less 
biased. These are the so called “value traps,” which are “stocks that appear cheap but in fact do not 
appreciate.” (MSCI, 2016) 
The factor is extremely cyclical and performs well in periods of economic expansion, while generally 
has a poor performance during bad times.  
2.5    High Quality Factor Premium: Good Vs Bad Fundamentals 
The High Quality Factor identifies stocks characterized by above-the-average standards in terms of 
fundamental variables. The most common indicators are Return on Equity (ROE), earnings stability over 
 
29 The reciprocal of the most common P/E. It leads to inverse ranking. 
30 The factors have interactions and traits in common when they are implemented, complicating the work of researchers 
who try to isolate them. 
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the years and low financial leverage. A stock is assigned the title of “High Quality stock” if the score 
calculated on the selected indicators is in a predetermined quantile of the distribution31. 
R. Sloan (1996) was the first to investigate the relationship between future stock prices and current 
earnings, identifying that “stock prices fail to reflect fully information contained in the accrual and cash 
flow components of current earnings until that information impacts future earnings.” He also identifies 
key components in the communication of current earnings to detect the potential for a future price 
increase. Additionally, there are also other pieces of information that are relevant for the investors, since 
they must have clean, reliable and verifiable data from the financial statements of the companies. 
For these reasons, MSCI (2016) in the construction of the Quality Index takes into consideration financial 
leverage, discarding firms with high level of indebtedness, and stability of the earnings across time, 
excluding firms with inconstant results. The Index achieves diversification by imposing restrictions on 
the weight allocation and is rebalanced twice a year. 
This factor has performed slightly better than its benchmark, without being more cyclical than the 
average stock in the market. Many researchers confirm the aforementioned result (MSCI, 2016). In 
particular, R. Novy-Marx (2012) illustrates that an investor can obtain the same exposure by adding high 
quality assets to her portfolio without overpaying them or following a value strategy in which she buys 
average quality assets at cheap prices. In his analysis he finds that, with the proper regression controls in 
place, “gross profitability has the same power as value strategies.” Gross profitability is another variable 
used by researchers to address the same quality characteristic that current earnings identify, showing an 
overlap between the two factors.  
Novy Marx (2012) states that following a quality strategy based on gross profitability or a value strategy 
tailored on book-to-market ratios has a comparable accuracy in the forecast of the cross-section of 
average returns, which means that, in the end, they identify similar stocks. Moreover, he states that 
“Quality investing exploits another dimension of Value,” with the difference that “Value strategies buy 
assets at bargain prices; quality strategies do this by buying uncommonly productive assets.” Mixing the 
two dimensions fruitfully can help investors to discern between bargain stocks and value traps. In 
conclusion, he highlights that adding the Quality factor to the portfolio substantially increases the 
performance of Momentum-based strategy too. His research suggests that a balanced mix of factors, 
tailored on each market phase, can enhance the performance of investors who rely on factor investing.  
 




Summing up, the High Quality factor is highly interconnected with factors traditionally linked to 
companies whose profitability has been stable and significant over time (Alford, 2016). 
2.6    Low Volatility Factor Premium: Low Vs High Volatility 
The Low Volatility factor identifies stocks whose prices are more stable than average and less subject to 
extreme swings. The premium awarded to these stocks has been documented for the first time in 1972, 
when Haugen and Heins (1972) documented a surprisingly negative relation between return and 
volatility, both among stocks and bonds in the respective U.S. markets. Similar results have been found 
also by other researchers, such as Jagannathan and Ma (2003) who show how the minimum variance 
portfolio has both higher returns and lower risk than a cap-weighted benchmark in the U.S. Stock Market.  
The impact of this research has been huge, with investors transferring assets from inefficient 
capitalization-weighted portfolios, overloaded with expensive growth stocks, into more efficient 
investments (Baker and Haugen, 2012). The last two researchers mention in their paper that “the fact that 
low risk stocks have higher expected returns is a remarkable anomaly in the field of finance,” since it is 
persistent and comprehensive, being common to all equity markets in the world (Baker and Haugen, 
2012). Furthermore, it also “contradicts the very core of finance: that risk bearing can be expected to 
produce a reward” (Baker and Haugen, 2012), as instead stated in the introduction to the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964) and commonly recognized in academia. In their study, the two authors 
select a large sample of stocks from developed and non-developed countries across the world, reaching 
similar results in each one of them. They conclude that “the basic pillar of finance, that greater risk can 
be expected to produce a greater reward, has fallen” and that “the reward for bearing risk can be 
negative.” (Baker and Haugen, 2012) As this dramatic result contradicts the principles of theory of 
finance at their basis, some critics predicted that the low-volatility anomaly would be arbitraged away 
(Arnott, 2016). However, both MSCI and S&P have now published indexes based on the concept of Low 
Volatility to capture this risk premium. 
Several academics and practitioners have tried to find an explanation for the Low Volatility anomaly, 
showing how stocks characterized by this factor have a smaller demand that High Volatility stocks. The 
theories range from behavioral finance, with overconfident investors who overpay for famous and 
overhyped stocks (Blitz, 2019), to agency issues that create diverging interest between investors and their 
clients (Karcescki, 2002) and constraints on leverage and shorting (Frazzini, 2014). Another explanation 
lies in the typical fund manager’s mandate to beat the benchmark which disincentivizes arbitrage 
operations (Baker, 2011). However, the most common justification is the “lottery effect,” which indicates 
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how investors prefer stocks with large potential upside even if the chances of winning are small, with 
respect to more stable stocks32. Vogel (2016) finds that, after controlling for the lottery effect, the Beta 
anomaly is not observed anymore and the results indicate the traditional, positive relationship between 
beta coefficients and expected returns, in accordance with the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model.  
An additional remark on the calculation of volatility across the different studies is that, even if the metrics 
used change33, the results are consistent. In conclusion, the empirical evidence of this anomaly “is still a 
puzzle, since is it clearly at odds with one of the most basic principles of finance, that higher volatility is 
associated with higher returns.” (Blitz, 2007)  
Coming to the practitioners’ world, the Index created by MSCI aims at capturing the Low Volatility 
premium by weighting stocks already included in a parent Index (MSCI World) and optimizing the mix 
based on a set of constraints to make the Index investable and replicable to investors. The weighting 
criteria is the inverse of historical variance, so that Low Volatility stocks have more importance than the 
others in the portfolio. Another methodology always brought to market by MSCI is the minimum 
variance optimization based on the calculation of the lowest forecast volatility.  
In terms of performance and cyclicality, the Low Volatility factor has proved to be a great hedge during 
periods of economic downturn, especially because of the stability of the price of the selected stocks, 
which are less hit than others by market crashes. In particular, Low Volatility stocks outperformed the 
market after the crash of the Dot Com bubble in the early 2000’s and in 2008, when the financial crisis 
unfolded, which is also why Low Volatility strategies are defined as “Conservative” and “Defensive” 
strategies. 
2.7    Dividend Yield Factor Premium: High Vs Low Dividends 
The Dividend Yield factor selects stocks with larger than average dividends. The discovery of a positive 
relationship between the expected Dividend Yield and the relative risk-adjusted return originally dates 
back to research conducted by Blume (1980). Fama and French (1988) reached the same results, 
especially considering a longer time span in the calculation of the performance, in the 2-4 year range.  
A relevant consideration in the Dividend Yield analysis is related to the influence of taxation of 
dividends: in order to properly account for the differences among countries in capital gain and dividends 
taxation, it is necessary to compute pre-tax dividends and make comparisons only within the same 
 
32 Stable stocks have more wins but with smaller swings. 




country. Furthermore, the Dividend Yield is “an unreliable indicator since it is smoothed and manipulated 
by the company,” (Ang and Bekaert, 2007) which can slash or increase it depending on many internal 
company considerations. The authors state that this variable is inconsistent because it is not objective 
and its use in statistical regression produces inferences that are not significant or robust, contrary to what 
other researchers, such as Fama and French (1988) have found.  
The same result, even if in a different context and before the Dividend Yield was considered a potential 
factor, was achieved by Black and Scholes (1974). After adjusting stock returns for volatility, the authors 
didn’t find any statistically significant relationship between dividend yields and stock returns. 
In terms of cyclicality, the Dividend Yield factor basically follows the trend of the market, since the 
amount of dividends that a company is expected to distribute to the shareholders is closely related to the 
expected future performance of the firm in the economy34.  
Some improvements in capturing the risk premium of this factor have been made by MSCI (2016), which 
includes different metrics in the construction of its High Yield Index, starting with a “screening process 
of securities with a track record of consistent dividend payments and with the capacity to sustain dividend 
payouts into the future.” Moreover, MSCI blends this factor with characteristics that fall under the High 
Quality factor, such as ROE and leverage, and under the Momentum factor (12-month price 
performance), to ensure that the selected companies will not experience deterioration in their 
fundamentals, leading to cuts or reductions in the dividends. 
2.8    Other Factor Theories 
Since the inception of factor investing, the amount of theories and factors that have been investigated 
has been very large. The increase in computational power and the ability to run back testing, cross 
analysis and time series regression in a large scale has also helped the development of new strategies 
based on the concept that “assets are bundles of risk factors” and the relative premiums are the 
compensation for bearing those risks (Ang, 2014). Researchers have isolated 59 new factors just during 
2010-2012 and the total amount has even crossed 300 (Harvey, 2015). Some authors raise the critique 
that not all these factors are relevant and most of them target the same characteristics (Berkin, 2016). 
Examples of newly discovered factors are the following: leverage, asset growth, R&D costs and liquidity.  
 
34 There are many reasons that can lead a company to increase or decrease its dividends, sometimes also partly unrelated 
to its performance. 
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Another approach, called “Fundamental Indexation” and described by Arnott (2005) applies concepts 
from fundamental analysis to determine ranking among securities, which are then weighted in the 
constructed portfolio depending on their fundamental factors. The results outperform the traditional cap-
weighted portfolios, which are dominated by a small number of large stocks and can’t capture other risk 
premiums (Invesco Research, 2017). 
Other studies apply factor investing principles to other investable assets such as corporate and 
government bonds: Fama and French (1992) start from the idea of integration among different financial 
markets to explain how common factors between stocks and bonds can explain their returns. They 
identify Maturity and Default Risk as the two key determinants for the fixed income market, showing 
that bearing these risks generate superior returns for the investors. In the following years other bond 
factors have been isolated, such as Liquidity and the Steepness of the Yield Curve.  
More recently, a new investment approach, called “Alternative Risk Premia,” identifies and includes in 
the active portfolio stocks that have significant exposure to specific factors, accessing “uncorrelated, 
complimentary sources of return.” (Reid, 2019) The novelty of this approach is that the focus is not only 
on common stocks, but across the entire spectrum of investable assets, including bonds, other funds, 
commodities, currencies and derivatives on interest rates35. To generate the appropriate exposure, this 
strategy needs to implement a long/short portfolio, which makes it available almost only to hedge funds, 
not subject to the traditional constraints of mutual funds. 
2.9    Conclusions 
The rise of factors and factor investing has led researchers to investigate and determine what the sources 
of risk premiums are and if they are persistent over time and consistent with the economic and financial 
theories. We have shown how the debate is still open for most of the factors, with academics split between 
different views on the importance and effectiveness in the explanation of the stock returns. 
In the next chapter we turn to the implementation of the six factors in our analysis, describing the 
identification process and comparing the performance of our indexes among themselves and with respect 
to the common benchmark of S&P 500. 
  
 






Chapter 3 - Factor Indexes and Relative Performance  
3.1   Introduction to Chapter 3  
In this chapter we analyze and discuss the main setting and structure of our analysis of mutual funds 
managers performance. In our analysis we take into consideration six different factors and build six 
indexes based on each of them, to capture the expected premium connected with these factors with 
respect to the return of the stocks of S&P 500 Index. After selecting the stocks and constructing the 
indexes with the proper weighting criteria, we employ the constructed indexes as the six variables to 
perform a multiple linear regression on the performance of the mutual funds selected for our study. 
The mutual funds that we analyze are chosen based on specific criteria that are developed in chapter 4. 
Our analysis is commonly referred to as “Style Analysis” and allows us to determine which are the factors 
that can best explain the excess returns of the selected mutual funds. Starting from the results of our 
multiple regression, we will then assess whether or not the mutual funds managers really deserve their 
annual fees.  
The chapter describes the construction of the six indexes and compares the returns among them and with 
respect to the reference index, the S&P 500. 
3.2    The Six Factors Indexes and the Selection Criteria  
As previously mentioned in chapter 2, over 300 relevant factors have been identified by the researchers. 
However, we are going to perform our analysis just by selecting the six factors that have been considered 
most relevant in the majority of papers on factor investing and whose historical premium have strong 
foundations. The aforementioned factors are the following: size, value, momentum, high quality, low 
volatility and dividend yield.  
In our analysis, we obtained and gathered data from Bloomberg, ranking S&P 500 stocks depending on 
their specific characteristics and then built the relative indexes, which will then represent the variables 
of our constrained multiple regression over the excess return achieved by the mutual funds under 
examination. The stocks taken under consideration were only the stocks included in the S&P 500 Index 
in the period between March 31st 1999 and December 31st 2019. All values are adjusted for dividends 
and stock splits, so that the adjusted close price at the end of the day represent the actual price of the 




We perform a full revaluation of our indexes every three months36, in order to have a rebalancing 
frequency that can approximate that of mutual funds. Rebalancing the portfolio leads to some costs, such 
as transaction and computational costs. Every time the portfolio is rebalanced, the data is gathered for all 
securities available on the revaluation date and an updated ranking is produced. Based on that, the indexes 
are reweighted and an ideal portfolio manager mirroring the index would have to perform the necessary 
transactions in the market, adding new stocks, unwinding positions or changing her exposure. This is not 
computationally cumbersome or particularly time-consuming, since all the calculations are pretty simple, 
but the managers incur in transaction costs that can’t be ignored.  
The reasons to choose only S&P 500 stocks are manifold: the abundance of immediately accessible data 
via Bloomberg, the dimensions of the firms37, the accuracy of their reports, the large number of funds 
whose strategy is exclusively based on S&P 500 and the very high liquidity in the market. Furthermore, 
many researchers have already applied factor investing theory to this market, finding the interesting 
results discussed in chapter 2.  
We now turn to the introduction of the factor indexes and the relative criteria implemented to rank the 
stocks.  
3.2.1    Size Index 
The size factor is the most common factor, brought to the attention of investors since the early stages of 
factor investing in 1992 by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in their Three Factor Model. The factor 
captures the premium linked to smaller firms, by market capitalization, with respect to the other 
companies included in the reference set. Market capitalization can be defined both as full or as free float; 
the latter is the one we have selected from Bloomberg to rank our firms.  
An important drawback of this way of constructing indexes is the number of firms that are excluded from 
S&P 500 Index during each 3 months period and, subsequently, fall out of our universe portfolio too. If 
they are not included in our indexes, no problem arises, otherwise we face the risk of survivor bias. This 
bias, particularly exacerbated among the smallest firms of S&P 500, is fully addressed in section 5.5. 
In line with the findings of the researchers E. Fama and K. French, who highlighted this factor as one the 
most relevant in determining the premium gained by stock market investors, the 20-year historical 
 
36 We rebalance the indexes on the last available trading day of March, June, September and December. 
37 If firms have a too small market capitalization, the price can be altered by mutual funds increasing or decreasing their 
positions. S&P 500 stocks do not present this issue.  
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performance of the Size Index resulted in a very large 927.87%, more than six fold the return of the S&P 
500 Index in the same period. In the following graph we confront the returns of the two indexes over 
time, where the difference in the cumulative performance is extremely clear.  
Graph 3. 1 
 
3.2.2    Value Index 
The value factor is commonly considered to be responsible for the premium that the so-called “value 
stocks” have typically returned over “growth stocks.” This factor, however, has not been as constant over 
the years as the small-versus-large premium captured by the size factor. For example, growth stocks 
overperformed value stocks in the years of the Dot Com bubble before 2001, while afterwards the trend 
reversed in favor of value stocks. A stock is classified as “value” when its current price is lower with 
respect to its fundamentals, while if the stock is expected to return an above-the-average performance 
over time because of its future potential, it falls under the category of growth stocks. 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of Size Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 





There are several indicators traditionally used by investors to address this factor: among them, we select 
the price to book ratio (P/B ratio) and price over earnings (P/E ratio) to build our Index38. Both P/B and 
P/E are calculated over the previous 12 months at each rebalancing date. The stocks are then ranked 
twice, first based on their P/E, from lowest to highest, and then on their P/B, always from lowest to 
highest. The rationale behind this solution is strictly connected to the definition of “Value stocks,” which 
are expected to be strongly undervalued. After that, we sum the two separated ranking to assess the final 
ranking among the stocks of S&P 500.  
Also this Index has provided a consistent and absolutely relevant return in excess of S&P 500 in the 20 
years of our analysis, in accordance with the prevailing literature that identifies in the contraposition of 
“Value versus Growth” another source of historical premiums in the stock market. The returns are 
compared in graph 3.2. 
 
 
38 There are many other possible combinations of Value indicators, such as forward P/E and CAPE (Cyclically Adjusted P/E), 
which, however, are less common in the financial literature. 
Value Index Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of Value Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 
Graph 3. 2 
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3.2.3    Momentum Index 
The Momentum Index selects the stocks whose performances have been particularly strong during a 
specified period of time, relative to the other securities in our set. Given the outlook of the mutual fund 
managers we are analyzing39 and the relative stability of their portfolio composition, with not too many 
adjustments per each period, we have decided to set our reference time for the Momentum Index to one 
year. Subsequently, at each rebalancing date we calculate the best performing stocks of the last 12 months 
and accordingly update the stocks listed in the Index. 
The expectation, as reported by Ang (2018), is that the Momentum Index would substantially outperform 
the main S&P 500 Index in periods of economic expansions and underperform in recessions, given its 
exposure to cyclicality. Nevertheless, our sample years didn’t report the same strong positive 
performance, as can be easily spotted in graph 3.3. A possible explanation points to the selected time 
span, which particularly affects Momentum Indexes, as the main cause of the underperformance. As a 
matter of fact, our Index suffered especially during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, showing that this 
kind of selection strategy is not appropriate during periods of extraordinary financial turmoil. It is 
commonly recognized that the most defensive factor against periods of economic downturn is instead 
the Low Volatility factor.  
An additional aspect that has to be taken into consideration is the length of the reference period 
implementing the Momentum Index, because one year might be too long and not sensitive enough to 
short-term runs in the market price. Furthermore, momentum strategies are usually constructed with a 
long-short portfolio, buying winners and selling losers. If, like in our Index, only long positions are 
allowed40, the performance can be below expectations. Additionally, as reported by Harvey (2015), this 
factor is particularly exposed to entry point risk, which can determine a prolonged underperformance of 
the Index in the case its inception coincides with a sharp decline of the market.  
 
39 The managers under examination are long-term investors, focused on a buy-and-hold strategy and minimizing trades. 





3.2.4    High Quality Index 
This factor is meant to capture the excess return on stocks characterized by specific quality metrics above 
the average of their peers. Most of the metrics are recollected from fundamental analysis, such as ROE, 
stability in earnings and growth, strength of the balance sheet41 and low debt. Most investors focus on 
these indicators to select securities to add to their portfolio in a bottom-up approach, together with a more 
technical screening based on volatility, correlation and diversification among stocks. 
We decided to focus on two of the most relevant and, at the same time, common key metrics: ROE, based 
on the last 12 months, and financial leverage ratio, calculated as total amount of debt outstanding over 
shareholders’ equity. We then proceeded in ranking the stocks with the same mechanism in the 
construction of the Value Index. Other researchers have included different metrics in the calculation42, 
 
41 Measured by positive cash flow, balanced capital structure and income generating assets. 
42 Sloan (1996) used low accruals as proxy for earnings quality, Asness (2013) added profitability, growth and payout ratio. 
Momentum Index Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of Momentum Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 
Graph 3. 3 
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always looking for an indicator reliable enough in the identification of stocks representing this systematic 
premium in the market.  
The performance of this Index didn’t exceed the return of the S&P 500, as it is shown in graph 3.4, 
proving not to be reliable enough in periods of crisis such as the 2001 Dot Com crisis or the 2008 
Financial Crisis, where its value decreased by 38.39%. The final performance over the 20-year span is 
slightly below the S&P 500 (+133.40%). 
 
 
3.2.5    Low Volatility Index 
Another well-known source of systematic excess return is the factor that identifies stocks with lower than 
average volatility, beta or idiosyncratic risk. We measure “Low Volatility” by the standard deviation of 
the returns throughout the last 12 months at each rebalancing date.  
High Quality Index Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of High Quality Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 




The Low Volatility Index is expected to perform well above the market during recessions and periods of 
uncertainty in the economy, where more volatile stocks underperform the market. It selects securities 
linked to non-cyclical, demand driven sectors such as Food, Beverage and other Consumer Staples.  
Our Index responded well during the 2008 crisis too, recording a cumulative loss of -24.3% in the two 
worst quarters of 2008, when S&P 500 was hit by a total loss of -35.7%. On the other side, the Index is 
not expected to fully participate in the periods of recovery and market booms. Another drawback of the 
Index is that “low volatility can end abruptly and a volatility crash can ensue” (Williams, 2017), with the 
Index having sudden, unexpected jumps in its volatility. 
The cumulative return over the 20 years span is substantial and well above the S&P 500 (graph 3.5).  
 
 
Low Volatility Index Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of Low Volatility Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 
Graph 3. 5 
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3.2.6    Dividend Yield Index 
The last of our indexes is based on stocks whose dividend yield above the average should capture an 
excess return over the other securities. As a remark, all our calculations are based on the closing price of 
the stocks at each rebalancing date, adjusted for dividends and stock splits. By doing this, the results will 
not be affected by actions that do not impact the total value of the stocks but just their nominal price. The 
dividend yield is adjusted and calculated for the last 12 months before each rebalancing date. 
The selected securities returned a performance well above the S&P 500, as depicted in graph 3.6. 
 
3.3    Weighting Criteria 
There are multiple weighting criteria both in literature and in the factor indexes available to investors 
across the world. For example, Fama and French (1992) constructed both value-weighted and equally 
weighted portfolios. Other investors follow more complicated procedure, such as mean-variance 
optimization and risk models. 
Dividend Yield Index Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of Dividend Yield Index and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 




In our case, we decided to apply the following criteria to all indexes: the 25 stocks with the highest 
exposure to a specific factor are assigned a 2% weight for that specific index, the following 25 most 
exposed stocks have a 1% weight and the stocks ranked 51-100 are given a 0.5% weight. The remaining 
400 stocks43 are excluded from the index, since their exposure to the factor is not significative. The 
weights are revaluated again at every rebalancing date, which are March 31st, June 30th, September 30th 
and December 31st. When the market is closed on the selected rebalancing date, we select the last 
available trading day to perform the recalibration at the closing prices adjusted for dividends and stock 
splits. The rebalancing works in this way: we take the entire S&P 500 stocks and rank them again based 
on the exposure to one specific factor, performing the consequent adjustment to the index depending on 
the new ranking. The operation is repeated for each of the six indexes and the respective factors, each 
time classifying the stocks depending on their exposure. 
The weighting criteria we choose fits our goal of constructing balanced indexes that are not influenced 
by the performance of a few overweighted stocks. Furthermore, given the objective of explaining the 
performance of mutual fund managers, our indexes not only need to capture the factors responsible for 
expected premiums, but they must also be broad enough to partly mirror the performance of S&P 500, 
the common benchmark among all the funds we analyze. In addition, we must not include too many 
stocks, in order to follow a strategy that maintains the rebalancing costs relatively low at every 
recalibration date, given the necessary adjustments and transactions. This weighting strategy is then a 
compromise between holding just a few very large investments or too many small positions.  
Furthermore, since the stocks we are considering have a large market capitalization overall, there is no 
risk of directly influencing the share price by the managers buying or selling stakes worth of millions of 
dollars44. 
Another concern regarding the weighting criteria is linked to the survivor bias and the periodic 
recalibration of the indexes. Since our index is retroactively built, we excluded the stocks whose tickers 
disappeared from one rebalancing date to another, with no regards for the motivation (mergers, 
bankruptcy, cancellation from S&P 500 due to inadequate compliance to minimum requirements such as 
minimum capitalization or not enough floating shares available to investors). A more detailed digression 
 
43 The exact number ranges between 399 and 405, depending on how many stocks are included in S&P 500 in each period. 
44 On December 31st 2019, the average market capitalization was $ 53.85 billion, with the smallest firm (Nektar Therapeutics) 
having a free float of $ 3.19 billion. 
46 
on the effects of the survivor bias and its relationship with S&P 500 and mutual funds is addressed in 
section 5.5. 
We avoided potential distortions of our indexes by assigning a zero weight to the securities involved in 
extraordinary operations or excluded from the indexes, so that the focus is only on capturing the six 
factors and their relative unbiased performance.  
3.4    Indexes Comparison 
Before turning to the multiple linear variable regression of the excess returns of mutual funds, we make 
a short digression comparing the returns of the six factor indexes and S&P 500 over the selected 20-year 
time span. Graph 3.7 provides a visual representation of their returns, while Table 3.1 reports the average 
return45, volatility and Sharpe Ratio of each of them. The Sharpe Ratio is calculated using the risk-free 
rate, whose proxy is the 3-month average return on U.S. Treasury bills.  
 
 
45 The average return is calculated with the arithmetic mean over 3 months, in accordance with the Sharpe Ratio. 
Factor Indexes Vs S&P 500 Returns 
Comparison of the cumulative percentage returns of factor indexes and S&P 500 from 03-31-1999 to 12-31-2019 





The Sharpe Ratio measures the performance of the indexes with respect to the risk-free asset, after 
adjusting for their total risk. It can also be used as a ranking tool, providing insights on the best and worst 
performing indexes. In particular after adjusting for the risk, four factors out of six record a better Sharpe 
Ratio than the benchmark, with a substantial underperformance of Momentum and High Quality. 
Moreover, the Momentum factor has a lower average absolute return than the S&P 500, mainly due to 
the extremely negative performance during the Financial Crisis. The High Quality factor, instead, has a 
larger average return but at the same time is also more volatile and the Sharpe Ratio is reduced 
accordingly.  
On the other hand, the Size factor provides a superior return with the highest Sharpe Ratio, in spite of 
being the second most volatile index. Given the larger diversification of the benchmark, it is not 
surprising that our indexes are overall more volatile, even the Low Volatility Index, which is supposed 
to select the less volatile stocks. However, as previously mentioned, this Index works very well during 
recessions but is also subject to sudden changes in its volatility.  
After adjusting for the total risk, both the Value, Low Volatility and Dividend Yield Indexes report 
similar Sharpe Ratios, well above the reference index. This suggests that the historical premium is 
actually captured by our selection, as it is also done by the Size Index. Coming to the remaining two 
indexes with a performance in line or below with S&P 500, different indicators might have worked better. 
However, the debate for the persistence of historical premiums over time, independently from the time 














8.86% 8.42% 10.34% 5.73% 4.16% 13.90% 5.17% 1.70% 
Volatility  
(St. Dev.) 
19.96% 18.34% 24.32% 17.68% 20.83% 22.70% 12.71%  
Sharpe Ratio 
(R-Rf)/St. Dev 
0.358 0.366 0.355 0.228 0.118 0.537 0.273  
Return, volatility and Sharpe Index of Factor Indexes and S&P 500 Index (Annualized) 
Table 3. 1 
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After these remarks on the performance of our indexes, we proceed with the introduction of the selected 
mutual funds and the relative multiple variable regression to determine the component of skill of the 






Chapter 4 - RBSA and Interpretation of the Results 
4.1    Introduction 
In this chapter we develop the analysis of mutual funds performances with respect to the six passive 
indexes by applying a multiple linear variable regression on their excess returns. The regression is also 
called Returns-Based Style Regression (RBSA) since it aims at determining the best composition of the 
portfolio made of the passive indexes that can best explain the performance of the mutual funds. Our 
main goal is to measure the statistical significance and the average value of the excess returns net of fees 
achieved by the managers, called Alpha. If this value is different from zero, the managers have skills, 
otherwise they do not add measurable value to the performance. 
We only select top mutual funds meeting specific requirements and whose cumulative performance has 
been consistently above the S&P 500 Index. All these funds belong to the high tail of the distribution of 
mutual funds returns, indicating that they are all run by the most successful managers. We also add some 
constraints to fully isolate and identify the drivers of the excess returns measured across the years, 
without being influenced by leveraging, derivatives, or by other financial instruments different from 
stocks and cash. The first goal of the Style Analysis regression is to determine which factors are the most 
relevant to explain the performance of the selected managers. 
The regression uses our six indexes to capture the effect of factor exposure on the returns achieved by 
the managers. The results determine that, overall, the performance of the selected mutual funds is best 
described by the following factors, in order of importance: High Quality, Dividend Yield and Low 
Volatility. The remaining Momentum, Size, and Value factors are not included in the results as they do 
not explain the mutual funds returns as well as the other passive indexes. The average explained variance 
of the regressions performed, also known as R2, is 34.96%, showing that our indexes can only explain 
part of the excess returns achieved by the managers. This is consistent with the prevailing literature which 
affirms that if the analyzed managers are top performers, the analysis identifies some relevant component 
of skills in the explanation of their returns. (Fama and French, 2010) 
We further investigate and exclude the potential explanations of the moderate R2 of the regressions, such 
as luck and bad choices in the variables, concluding that at least most of the returns can’t be explained 
without assuming a certain degree of skills. Furthermore, we run a simple analysis to determine the Total 
Alpha Return of each fund: the relative T-statistics identifies 18 significant Alphas out of the 30 returns. 




18 managers. The analysis is concluded with the recognition of the management fees in the annualized 
Alphas, determining that these 18 managers granted a large adjusted Alpha of 3.98% to their investors 
and indeed deserved their fees. On the other hand, the average Alpha for the entire group of 30 managers 
is 3.25% but, given the lower significance of the returns of the remaining 12 managers, only the 
previously mentioned 18 managers deserve to be compensated for their skills. 
The chapter makes also some final remarks on the analysis of the managers’ performance, showing that 
the excess returns are not attributable to luck in the stock selection, but to managers’ skills. Eventually, 
we relax the initial constraints and compare our results with some of the most important research on this 
topic.  
4.2    Constraints in the Selection of Funds  
In order to focus exclusively on the factors determining the performance of fund managers, we need to 
impose some restrictions on the selection of the funds that we add to our pool of analysis. First of all, we 
choose only mutual funds, not hedge funds. The main reason is the lack of available information 
regarding hedge funds, whose performances are very often disclosed only to the investors and, most 
importantly, are not as transparent as mutual funds in reporting their holdings, strategies and activities. 
Furthermore, their Net Asset Value (NAV) is not publicly reported and their valuation can be extremely 
difficult to assess, as some well-known failures demonstrate46. On the other hand, open-ended mutual 
funds are subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940, they are available to all investors and their 
holdings are disclosed to the public on a periodic basis. Subsequently, information regarding mutual 
funds is reliable and we gather the necessary information at each rebalancing date from Bloomberg 
database.  
Nowadays managers have plenty of financial instruments to choose to add to their holdings, given the 
expansion of the financial markets, the constant innovation and introduction of new investable 
instruments. However, since our focus is on equity performance only, we do not analyze funds that can 
invest in other instruments rather than stocks and cash. Thereafter, no position in corporate bonds or 
government bonds is allowed and the selected mutual funds are bounded to invest only in the equity 
market or to hold liquidity. Derivatives are not allowed either, since they can substantially alter the 
managers’ performance, for example by hedging or leveraging the positions, and are almost impossible 
to track with passive indexes.  
 
46 Just to name a few: Madoff Investment Securities LLC (2009), Amaranth Advisors LLC (2007) and LTCM (1998). 
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Furthermore, short positions are not allowed and the capital of the funds must be fully invested in the 
stock market or kept as cash. These constraints are reported in the multiple variable linear regression by 
imposing a non-strict inequality on the coefficients47, which can only assume values larger or equal to 
zero. The inequality prevents short positions, since it bounds the net exposure to a specific factor to 
positive or null values. Additionally, the funds are prohibited from borrowing money from other sources: 
they can hold and raise more cash but the possibility to leverage their positions is precluded.  
Furthermore, full investment of the capital paid up by the investors is addressed by imposing the 
following constraint: the sum of the coefficients must be equal to one. This constraint imposes that 100% 
of the fund, no more and no less, must be invested or kept liquid. We assign a risk-free rate of return to 
cash hold as liquidity by the investors. The best proxy of the risk-free rate is the return on 3-months U.S. 
Treasury Bills. 
Additional restrictions are applied in the selection of mutual funds:  
- they must have been active throughout the entire 20 years considered; 
- they must have always been available to the public (NAV available daily) 
- their benchmark must be the S&P 500 Index 
- they must not be tilted toward a specific sector, but be allowed to invest broadly across the 
market48 
- they must be denominated in U.S. dollars 
- they must not invest in foreign equities or currencies 
These restrictions are necessary to avoid inaccuracies in the correct determination of the managers’ style, 
which otherwise would be imprecise because of incorrect style portfolios with respect to the actual 
holdings. Finally, among all the funds meeting these requirements, we select the 30 most successful 
funds which belong to the high tail of the distribution of mutual funds returns on a risk-adjusted basis.  
 
47 The estimated coefficients represent the weight assigned to each factor in the style portfolio. 




4.3    Returns-Based Style Analysis 
Returns-based style analysis (RBSA) is “a statistical technique that identifies what combination of long 
positions in passive indexes would have most closely replicated the actual performance of a fund over a 
specified time period.” (Lucas, 1996) The coefficients of the regression determine the portfolio's 
effective mix, describing the weights assigned to the variables in the regression to best replicate the 
performance of the mutual funds. The R2 coefficient, measuring the explained variance of the regression, 
is representative of the percentage of the returns attributed to asset allocation. Instead the R2 complement 
to one, 1-R2, explains the component of the returns attributed to security selection and market timing. 
The latter coefficient defines the manager’s skills we are assessing in the analysis. 
RBSA has been developed by William F. Sharpe (1988). The success of his paper led to the release of a 
commercial software to conduct a RBSA and has become a widespread analysis tool across the mutual 
fund industry. The model is useful to assess the effective asset allocation strategy of mutual funds, since 
it doesn’t rely on the portfolio holdings declared by the managers, but it is based only on the portfolio 
returns. By this way, RBSA is distinguished from holdings-based style analysis, which counts on the 
holdings reported in the prospectuses released by mutual fund managers to the public. 
RBSA, as every analytical tool attempting to describe fund performance, has advantages and drawbacks. 
Its main advantage is to be transparent in its mechanism, while other models, much more sophisticated, 
lack clarity and simplicity and can be redeemed as “black boxes.” (Lucas, 1996) On the other hand, 
RBSA relies heavily on assumptions and choices made before and during the analysis, such as the 
selection criteria and the appropriateness of the passive indexes. In fact, the indexes must be suited for 
the funds examined in terms of financial instruments and factor exposure, otherwise the results will not 
be informative, reporting a very low R2. 
4.4    Description of the Model 
Based on the non-negativity and no-leverage constraints explained in section 4.2, we build the following 
model to conduct a return-based style analysis on each of the 30 mutual funds. The target variable is the 
excess rate of return of the mutual funds, while the explanatory variables are the excess rates of return 
of the six factor indexes that we have previously created49 
The model is described in Equation 1.1, subject to the constraints in Equations 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
49 The excess rates of return is calculated over the risk-free rate for the corresponding time period. 
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Equation 1.1  
𝑅𝑡
𝑚.𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝑅𝐻𝑄𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑉𝑡 +
                    𝜀𝑡
𝑚.𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
,   𝑡 = 1,   .  .  .  , 𝑇 , 
where 𝑅𝑡
𝑚.𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
 denotes the excess returns of each one of the 30 mutual funds, α is the intercept, the six 
β coefficients are the estimated coefficients (weights of the style analysis portfolio), 𝑅𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡, 𝑅𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑡, 
𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡, 𝑅𝐻𝑄𝑡, 𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 and 𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑉𝑡 are the excess return of the factors indexes, 𝜀𝑡
𝑚.𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
 are the fund-
specific error terms. The regression is repeated for each fund. 
Equation 1.2 
The non-negativity constraint is satisfied by:  
𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0,         𝑖 = 1,   .  .  .  , 6 
Equation 1.2 
The no-leverage constraint is satisfied by: 




The estimated coefficients of the models represent the allocation weights to create a portfolio composed 
of the six indexes which best describes the managers’ style. The coefficients are recalibrated for each 
fund. The results are reported in Table 1.1 and we discuss them in the next section. 
4.5    Interpretation of the Results of the RBSA 
This section provides an interpretation of the results of the RBSA conducted over the 30 selected mutual 
funds. First of all, it is interesting to note that almost all funds follow similar styles: about 76% of the 
weight is allocated to the High Quality Index, while 13% goes to the Dividend Yield Index and almost 
10% to the Low Volatility Index.  
Given the constraints of the funds examined, it is consistent that the Size, Momentum and Value factors 
do not play a relevant role or, in this case, they are already partially included in the other three factors of 
the regression which performs better in the explanation of the returns. In particular, taking into 
consideration the dimension of the mutual funds, the Size factor is not easy to be easily accounted for, 




Momentum factor, even if firstly identified in 1997 by M. Carhart, has many investability constraints 
and the Value factor, where the stocks added to the portfolio are underpriced with respect to their 
fundamentals, has been much more difficult to target due to the rise of technology50 and “very often 
overwhelmed by the aggregate risks in the macroeconomy.” (Doskov, 2016) 
The main drivers of the selected mutual funds show that the managers rely heavily on the fundamental 
tools of investing, such as a consistent ROE together without excessive indebtedness, measured in our 
High Quality Index by the leverage ratio. Additional assets allocation takes into account the Low 
Volatility factor and the Dividend Yield factor. The former is well-known for its role in performing above 
its peers during periods of recession, granting a safer and more stable investment to the managers during 
bad times. The latter awards a positive stream of cash to the mutual funds and selects firms that are 
generally performing above their competitors and can afford to pay large dividends to the shareholders. 
The mutual fund managers can then use the proceeds to pay out dividends to the investors, without the 
need to sell some of their positions, avoiding additional transaction costs.  
In the interpretation of the factor allocation identified by the RBSA, we must also recall the importance 
of reporting to investors, which, in the case of mutual funds, have daily access to their quotas in the 
financial markets and prevent the managers from implementing more complex or extreme strategies, 
unlike what a hedge fund is entitled to do, for example. This can well explain why the style is pretty 
similar across the funds. Furthermore, these funds have very tight investment constraints described in 
their prospectuses, which make them avoid investment in more aggressive factors, such as the 
aforementioned Size Index. 
Coming to the accuracy of the analysis, we see that the R2 coefficient is moderate. Some of the reasons 
that can explain this moderate value are turnover rates different from those of the factor indexes, 
inconsistencies in the manager’s style and in its exposure to factors, inappropriateness of the benchmarks 
and financial instruments not included in the analysis. 
It is important to discuss, identify and eventually discount the performance for these factors, if they can’t 
be ruled out in the determination of the manager’s skills. First of all, we exclude that additional financial 
instruments and inappropriateness of the benchmark can decrease the accuracy of the regression, given 
the strict constraints we have preventively imposed. Coming to the turnover rates, they are specific for 
each mutual fund and can have a minor role, since no index can perfectly replicate the manager’s 
 
50 The technological progress has decreased the appeal of the Value factor in the 2000’s, given the larger number of investors 
able to target it. 
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decisions. However, the rebalancing dates we have chosen are selected to specifically address this point 
and to decrease the discrepancy between the turnover ratios of the managers and of our indexes. On the 
other hand, inconsistencies in the manager’s style arise when a manager changes many times his exposure 
to the factors, which are not able to properly track the returns anymore. However, considering the clear 
and specific description of the investment opportunities and the investment rules that the managers have 
to follow as depicted in the funds’ prospectuses, this explanation of the moderate R2 of the regressions 
can also be safely excluded.  
Finally, we can conclude that the coefficient 1-R2 is only marginally influenced by turnover rates and 
inconsistencies in the managers’ style, highlighting that the greatest part of the performance of these 
mutual funds is contributed by the managers’ skills in the security selection. As a confirmation of our 
results, we recall that the selected managers are all top performers, capable of achieving and maintaining 
large total returns over the years, well above the performance of their benchmark, the S&P 500. 
Subsequently, it is expected that a consistent component of skill should arise from the RBSA conducted.  
4.6    Total Alpha Returns 
After finding out that the factors exposure can only explain to a certain degree the mutual funds’ excess 
returns, we further investigate the magnitude of the skills of the managers and if they are statistically 
significant, by calculating the Total Alpha Returns and the related T-statistics. The Total Alpha Return 
identifies the total portion of the fund’s returns which is not explained by the style analysis portfolio 
created (Lucas, 1996). It is calculated as the arithmetic difference between the mutual fund’s returns and 
the returns of the style analysis portfolio, both measured quarterly.  
The Total Alpha Return can be divided into two components: market timing return and security selection 
return. These are both representative of the manager’s skills and their sum matches the total value added 
by the managers.  
Market timing is defined as the ability of the manager to carefully choose the rebalancing dates, 
modifying his exposure to the factors more efficiently than the relative benchmark, consequently 
achieving a superior return. Security selection is also known as stock picking, which is the ability of the 
manager to select additional stocks – or fewer stocks – than the indexes, based on the opportunity set 




Coming to the estimated average Alpha51 over the analyzed period of 20 years, it ranges from 0.63% to 
1.57%. The number itself, however, is meaningless without the T-statistics, which confronts the null 
hypothesis in which the manager does not add any value to the passive investment (𝜇 = 0) with the 
alternative hypothesis of a relevant component of the manager’s skill in the portfolio return, given the 
number of observation and its volatility.  
The results are mixed, highlighting that, at the 95% confidence level, 18 managers out of 30 show 
substantial skills that can not be reconducted to noise in the performance. The remaining 12 managers, 
even if they all achieved positive returns over the benchmark and the constructed style analysis portfolio, 
are not deemed to be responsible of the returns since the alphas are not statistically significant enough, 
given the volatility of their quarterly returns. If we lower our confidence interval to 90%, the number of 
managers achieving a significant performance, which can’t be attributed only to the factor exposure, rises 
to 24.  
The next step in the analysis is to determine if their fees are appropriate with respect to the extra return 
achieved because of their skills. As described in chapter 1, the managers shouldn’t be compensated just 
on their total return but also volatility must be taken into account into the calculation of their 
performance. This is what is measured by the coefficient 1-R2 and explained by the components of the 
Total Alpha Return (market timing and security selection), given the fact that all our assumptions hold 
and the results are statistically significant in determining the manager’s pure contribution to the returns.  
At the 95% confidence level, 18 out of the 30 pre-selected managers have statistically significant skills: 
in the next paragraph we discuss their average annual fees, checking if they are appropriate for the returns 
and if the managers really create additional value to the investors or if it ends up in paying for their 
service. If the managers do not add enough value with their skills with respect to the fees they collect, 
the investors would be better off investing their money in passive indexes with extremely low 
management fees. 
4.7    Do Managers Deserve Their Fees? 
The average annual fees or the 18 managers is 1.06%, slightly above the average for the category of 
mutual funds selected. We do not report the fees for the remaining 12 mutual funds whose managers do 
not add value with their activities, since the Alphas are not statistically significant. However, we highlight 
that there is also no evidence that the activities of these 12 managers are detrimental for the funds’ 
 
51 Always on a quarterly basis. 
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performances. The T-statistics only state that the skills do not play a key role in leading to the total 
returns, but there is no evidence that the investors would be better off by investing in passive indexes or 
that, after adjusting for the fees, the net returns would be inferior than those of the style portfolios.  
The 18 managers, instead, contribute on average to a Total Annual Alpha Return of 5.04% with their 
skills, leading to a net adjusted annual return after the fees of 3.98%, achieved because of the ability of 
the managers in selecting the best stocks and in timing the market.  
Our conclusion is that, among this pool of funds, the managers whose skills are statistically significant 
bring on an average 3.98% to the annual performance of their funds with their abilities, creating 
additional wealth for their investors. These managers, 60% of our selection, deserve to be compensated 
for their skills by receiving the management fees reported in Table 1.2. A discussion on how to 
distinguish ex ante the skillful managers is reported in section 5.4. 
4.8    Additional Remarks  
We now add some further remarks and considerations on the performance of the mutual fund managers 
and we also discuss what can happen if we relax some of the constraints.  
First of all, we mention how can we determine if the superior performance recorded by the 18 skillful 
managers has relevant components of luck or if it is only connected to the managers’ ability. Fama and 
French (2010) cover this question in their paper by applying a bootstrapping technique and running 
10000 simulations on the cross-section of mutual funds returns within their population. The inferences 
that Fama and French draw based on the cross-section analysis are that just a “few funds produce 
benchmark-adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs” and that evidence of superior 
performance is found only “in the extreme tails of the cross-section of mutual fund α estimates.”  
Given the a-priori selection of mutual funds that we made, we have studied the style and performances 
of superior managers only. They all belong to the top performers of the respective mutual fund 
classifications.  
Furthermore, the long time period, from the second quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2019, prevents 
temporary, short-run oscillations to distort the performance, which can be subsequently considered 
immune from these fluctuations to a large degree of confidence. Based on these points and on the results 
of the researchers Fama and French (2010), we can rightfully assume that, if a component of luck is 
included in the performance of the 18 most skillful managers, it is not the main source in the 




Our conclusion is then confirmed: a small number of active managers are able to provide superior cost-
adjusted returns to their investors, highlighting that these managers have skills that deserve to be 
compensated by the fees they collect from their investors on an annual basis. It must be noted, however, 
that our sample excludes funds which failed during the period under examination. The absence of these 
funds from the analysis and its impact is defined as “survivor bias.” 
Other remarks on the performances include the relaxation of some of the investment constraints that bind 
the investment opportunities of the mutual fund managers.  
For example, if we relax the constraints in Equation 1.1 and Equation 1.2, we allow for leverage and 
short selling, which can totally modify the performances of mutual funds. In fact, the managers can 
increase their weighting exposure to some factors by borrowing money and can also take short positions 
on the market, when they expect an economic downturn. The consequences would be that the returns can 
become more volatile (Aharon, 2019) and our indexes would not be suited to analyze the mutual funds 
anymore, resulting in a lot of statistical noise.  
Additionally, the opportunity set can be expanded by allowing international investments, bonds and 
derivatives. As before, the increase of the types of financial instruments that a manager can add to his 
holdings needs to be properly balanced with updated indexes and relaxed constraints on their 
construction. The main framework of the analysis is always the same, but the style portfolios need to be 
tailored depending on the investment opportunities. Otherwise, the regression would lead to a very low 
R2 due to inappropriate benchmarks and the results would not be statistically significant in determining 
the actual skills of the managers.  
A final remark in the construction of the indexes is that we purposely ignored transaction costs, 
management fees and expenses connected to the passive indexes. The only goal of the construction 
passive indexes was to create a good proxy of the style of mutual fund managers in the determination of 
the degree of skills in their performance. Moreover, indexes are not directly investable and, if an investor 
wants to replicate their holdings, she would face transaction costs and the connected expenses. However, 
for the scope of our analysis, the relevance of these costs would not be significant, since passive 
investments have very low expenses, usually below 0.2% annually52. The inclusion of the expenses in 
the indexes would result in a small reduction of their performances (up to a total of 4.23% in the 20-year 
 
52 Bloomberg, data retrieved on March 11th 2020. 
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time span), which is not relevant in magnitude compared to their performance and would only slightly 
tilt the results in favor of the active managers.  
4.9    Comparison of the Results with Other Researchers 
After describing the additional opportunities for the managers if we relax some constraints and the 
relative adjustments needed to properly account for their performance, we present some of the previous 
studies in RBSA and performance attribution.  
As mentioned before, RSBA was introduced by Sharpe (1988). After his publication, many researchers 
employed this technique looking for the determinants of superior returns in the market and their 
explanation. Sharpe himself (1992) presented an analysis of Trustees’ Commingled Fund from 1985 to 
1989. Without imposing constraints, the R2 coefficient of Sharpe’s regression totaled an extremely high 
95.20%, substantially excluding whatever implications for the skills of the managers in the determination 
of the performance of the fund. However, the estimated coefficients of the regression include some 
extreme positions, like a 110.35% position invested on Value Stocks and a short position of -43.62% in 
Medium Stocks. These weights do not represent realistic positions available to mutual funds and the 
results should not be taken under consideration. The constrained regression, instead, reports that Value 
Stocks (69.81%), Small Stocks (30.04%) and European Stocks (0.15%) explain 92.22% of the returns, 
again leaving very small room for the manager’s skills. 
Another relevant point of research by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2010) applies a cross-section 
analysis to mutual funds returns from 1984 to 2006, finding evidence that only few managers show a 
superior performance that, after adjusting for the expenses, grants a positive Total Alpha Return to the 
investors. The regression is based on the Three Factor Model presented by Fama and French (1993): 
market risk53, size effect and value effect. An additional factor is added to a second analysis, the 
Momentum effect identified by M. Carhart (1997). Both regressions highlight that “mutual fund investors 
in aggregate realize net returns that underperform” the models “by about the costs in expense ratios.” 
(Fama and French, 2010) The researchers also conclude that, “if there are fund managers with enough 
skill, their tracks are hidden in the aggregate results by the performance of managers with insufficient 
skill.” In fact, positive and significant Alphas are estimated only in the high tail of the distribution of the 
mutual funds returns. The final results of the bootstrap simulations “suggest that some managers do have 
sufficient skill to cover costs.”  
 




Coming back to our analysis, the high tail of the distribution is exactly where we have tried to select the 
managers from, discarding all funds that didn’t meet our criteria or didn’t achieve a superior performance 
with respect to the benchmark. The most relevant literature supports the main results of our analysis. 
Additional studies implement other solutions to increase the precision of the regression, introducing the 
concept of Returns-Based Style Analysis with Time-Varying Exposure (Van der Sluis, 2006) with 
improved results in the determination of the style portfolios and on performance measurement. Also, 
Markov (2004) implements a new framework based on a closer approach to the managers’ performance: 
he presents the new technique denominated Dynamic Style Analysis. The DSA specifically accounts for 
portfolio dynamics such as “gradual style drift or rapid changes in strategy” which would decrease the 
precision of the traditional static RBSA. Markov tests the new approach in the paper and finds that the 
accuracy of the model is increased with the only drawback being computational complexity with respect 
to previous approaches.  
Other research, instead, addresses different statistical problems connected with RBSA: Buetow (2012) 
shows that “multicollinearity is a common issue that arise when commercially-available indexes are 
used,” leading to “volatile results with little meaning.” The researchers suggest avoiding commercially-
available indexes, building instead “portfolio-specific benchmarks that properly capture the investment 
objectives of the portfolio.” On the basis of Buetow’s findings, we decided not to implement our analysis 
with MSCI Factor Tilt Indexes, but we created customized indexes based on the selected funds and their 
holdings.  
Another relevant point, which we have chosen not to cover in our statistical analysis but that can give 
additionally insights on the regressions, is discussed by Otten (2000). He recalls that “traditionally only 
point estimates of the style exposures have been reported,” because of the strict constraints that are 
required. The researcher introduces a new computational methodology based on the “asymptotic 
distribution of the style weights,” which allows him to calculate confidence intervals on the parameters 




4.10    Conclusions  
The main result of our analysis is that 18 out of the 30 selected managers, at the 95% confidence level, 
show substantial and significant skills, deserving the fees that they collect. The annual Total Alpha 
Return, adjusted for the expenses, is on average 3.98% for these 18 skillful managers.  
The RSBA analysis, instead, defined the style portfolio for each mutual fund, determining the relative 
benchmark to assess the performance that can be attributed to the manager’s skills. The average fund 
allocation can be described by the following factors: 76% High Quality factor, 13% Dividend Yield 
factor and 10% Low Volatility factor.54 The remaining factors - not included in the portfolio allocation 
by the multiple linear regression - are Momentum, Size and Value. 
 The moderate R2 of the regressions have been analyzed and discounted for the possible explanation, in 
accordance with the traditional tools of performance attribution analysis. Security selection and market 
timing are the two key determinants that explain the superior performance of the 18 managers whose 
extra return over the assigned style portfolio has been considered significant by the T-tests.  
The fundamental results of the analysis are in accordance with the conclusions of most researchers, who 
determined that “few funds produce benchmark-adjusted expected returns sufficient to cover their costs.” 
(Fama and French, 2010) The mutual funds that we analyzed are a-priori selected to belong to that 
subgroup of successful funds from the high tail of the distribution.  
In conclusion, 60% of the selected managers have substantial skills, provide extra total return to their 
investors and deserve their fees. The performance of the 18 active mutual funds run by skillful managers, 
adjusted for the management fees and expenses, is significantly higher than the correspondent passive 
indexes’ returns built on their factor exposure.  
In the next chapter we discuss the growing number of mutual funds and hedge funds that, during the last 
years, have started to implement strategies based on factor exposure, leading the rise of the so called 
“Smart Beta Funds” in the market. We also present the views of some researchers on the potential 















Chapter 5 - Further Considerations 
5.1    Introduction 
The present chapter is divided into two main parts: in the former we discuss the main concerns connected 
to the rapid rise of Smart Beta funds, while in the latter we make additional remarks on the main question 
of the paper – if mutual fund managers deserve their fees.  
First of all, we introduce implications for risk management practices on Smart Beta Funds, which have 
peculiar risks due to their characteristics which are shared at the same time with both passive and active 
funds and which classify them into a new category. Furthermore, we describe potential threats to the 
persistence of factor risk premiums, like crowding. 
The remaining sections of the chapter are devoted to the exploration of alternative methods to select a 
priori the most skilled managers. If investors are not able to distinguish skilled managers, they would be 
better off investing in passive indexes and avoiding large fees. Furthermore, we describe two of the 
problems encountered in the calculation of mutual funds performances: selection bias and survivor bias. 
Both distortions are relevant to our results and, overall, to research conducted on this topic. In conclusion, 
we make some final remarks and observations on our analysis and we point out the implications of the 
results for the average investor. 
5.2    Risks linked to Smart Beta Funds 
Smart Beta funds present characteristics common to both passive funds, such as low fees and rules-based 
investments, and active funds, like the deviation from the reference benchmark. Their rise in the last two 
decades, which has brought up to almost $ 1 Trillion the total amount of assets under administration of 
Factor-based ETFs, has led many investors to raise concerns about the most appropriate risk management 
practices. Smart Beta funds are, in fact, a new category of funds due to their specific characteristics, 
which needs tailored risk measurement and management tools.  
Most risk managers agree (Williams, 2017) that factor investing shares risks both with passive and active 
investment styles, with exposures varying more towards one or the other depending on the aggressiveness 
of Smart Beta strategies and other portfolio metrics. The common denominator, however, is that investors 
face a new mix of risks when they decide to allocate their money to these types of funds.  
The first type of risk, shared by all investors, is the Entry Risk, remarking that the moment in which the 




complicated and can’t be determined by the average investor, who may face substantial drawdowns if 
she enters a fund just before a market crash. Among factor investing, the factor which is most exposed 
to the entry risk is the Momentum factor, especially if, like in our analysis, investors can only add long 
positions. When Momentum stocks go out of favor, as during the Dot Com and Financial Crisis, the 
underperformance can be very severe.  
Another type of risk, mostly linked to the High Quality, Value and Momentum factors, is the Valuation 
Risk. This is the typical overvaluation risk of those firms able to increase their earnings even in the 
current low-growth market environment and whose multiples have increased well above the historical 
average. It is almost impossible to discern whether the overvaluation will be justified by the future 
performance of these companies or if they will go back to a price more in line with the rest of the market. 
Investors can protect themselves from this risk by diversifying their holdings into funds exposed to 
different factors, instead of focusing just on one of them. Nevertheless, diversification may come at the 
expense of the total performance of the portfolio but, if the economy experiences a market shock, a 
diversified portfolio reduces the negative consequences of overvaluation risk. However, investors must 
also take into consideration the correlation risk when they build a diversified portfolio: during market 
crashes the traditional correlation among different stocks or even across asset classes can be completely 
altered in the so-called “correlation breakdown.” During periods of extreme volatility in the market, 
correlations can temporarily change and what was considered a good protection or hedging tool may not 
behave as expected.  
Another relevant risk, connected to the previous one too, is the horizon risk: investors must consider that 
drawdowns can be prolonged in time, especially when following factor investing strategies55. Investors 
can navigate through the horizon and overvaluation risk only if their investment outlook is very long, 
otherwise they will be exposed to these risks. As before, diversification is a great tool in managing and 
containing the risks, especially if investors are not able to protect themselves by purchasing derivatives 
or other financial instruments that can provide a hedge towards market downturns. 
Furthermore, even if an investor follows all the rules of diversification, she can still be exposed to other 
types of risk, usually hidden in the portfolio construction: model risk and specification risk. The first one 
captures the fact that all models are, in the end, simplified description of economic and financial 
processes and might not be suited for all market environments. Models can fail in the description of 
 
55 For example, Value stocks underperformed Growth stocks during the 90’s; afterwards the trend reversed until the last 
couple of years.  
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market situations, especially if they are out of the ordinary. This risk potentially exposes all investors to 
inaccurate estimates and valuations, in particular during moments of crisis and when the so-called “Black 
Swans” happen. A Black Swan is defined by Taleb (2007) as a “rare and unpredictable outlier event” 
with extreme impact on the markets and which models totally fail to forecast.  
Also, the specification risk is incorporated in the portfolio construction process and, more specifically, 
in the phase when stocks are ranked based on their exposure to factors. A very important step is the 
definition of the key variables in the identification of factors: if a variable is not appropriate, the selection 
might be biased and generate undesired exposures to other market risks and factors. For example, an 
inconsistent factor identification can lead to increased exposure to macroeconomic risks and potential 
unexpected downsides.  
Summing up, factor investing poses a new challenge to investors: properly measuring and managing the 
risks associated with the new strategies. They must identify these risks and protect their portfolios with 
adequate diversification practices and, if they are available, other risk management tools. 
In the next section we highlight additional concerns that investors have to consider when they decide to 
invest in Smart Beta funds. 
5.3    Will the Risk Premiums Persist? 
Factors earn higher-than-average returns because they are exposed to specific risks. However, a recurring 
question among investors is how likely and how long these risk premiums will persist. The debate is still 
open, involving both academics and practitioners: overall, most of them agree upon a future decrease of 
the magnitude of the risk premiums, mainly due to the increased number of investors following factor 
strategies. The terminology that identifies the progressive disappearance of a profitable opportunity in 
the market due to increased participation of investors is “crowding.” As long as a way to achieve Alpha 
works, it will be exploited by a growing number of investors until it disappears. If the Alpha-generating 
strategy is known to the public and is reproducible at a low cost, more and more investors will allocate 
their funds until the opportunity disappears.  
Bender (2013) suggests that, however, not all the risk premiums will eventually be eroded by crowding. 
The researcher distinguishes between “systematic risks” and “systematic errors”: the former are 
connected to risk premiums that he doesn’t expect to vanish, while systematic errors are just temporary 
and, even if they can produce very large returns, they won’t last for a long time. For example, systematic 




bearing these type or risks, which can sometimes hit even the whole economy, are compensated with 
excess returns.  
On the other hand, systematic errors are mostly linked to human irrational behavior in the stock market, 
as defined in behavioral finance. Some examples of irrational behavior are overconfidence, over-reacting 
and herding. They are all related to investors’ biases that can determine a deviation of prices and can 
contribute to the factor anomalies that we observe in the markets. Overconfidence describes the tendency 
of investors to rely on their judgement ability much more than they should, given the accuracy of their 
evaluations. Over-reaction is the behavior that is connected to extreme swings in the market, leading to 
temporary under or overvaluation of stocks on the base of miscalibrated and often emotional judgements. 
Herding, instead, refers to “an obvious intent by investors to copy the behavior of other investors,” 
(Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000) a behavioral bias that can lead prices to rise due to the concentration 
of the investors in the same investable stocks. This tendency can be explained by the investors’ objective 
of not underperforming their peers, which drives most of them to make similar investing choices instead 
of fully expressing their personal views.  
For an investor, it is important to discern what is the actual source of a price arbitrage identified in the 
market, to understand if it will persist in the future (systematic risk) or if it will only be temporary 
(systematic errors or behavioral biases). Most researchers agree that both strands of thought are accurate 
and partially describe the risk premiums accorded to factors.  
Lastly, another relevant point for investors regards the new evaluation framework of fund managers: 
their performance should be evaluated accordingly to the fact that Smart Beta funds share characteristics 
both with passive and active funds, as described in the next section. Furthermore, we describe additional 
manager selection strategies besides the analysis of their past performance. 
5.4    Managers’ Evaluation and Selection 
One of the most critical points in factor investing is how to assess and evaluate the performance of fund 
managers. The need for an appropriate evaluation framework is discussed by Alford (2016), who 
suggests that each fund’s performance must be accounted depending on how much of the strategy is 
based on a proprietary strategy offering a superior performance or whether it simply replicates a passive 
index tilted towards certain factors. Clearly, the more a strategy is left to the managers’ discretion, the 
more they should be considered responsible for the final results.  
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Besides the evaluation problem, another extremely relevant aspect is connected to the a priori selection 
of talented managers: how can investors identify skillful managers before destinating their money to their 
funds and without relying exclusively on past performance?  
As commonly reported, past performance is not indicative of future performance (SEC Rule 156, 2013) 
and shouldn’t be used to estimate it. Even though, when it comes to managers evaluation, past 
performance plays a central role but is not sufficient since the returns and their allocation strategy must 
also be stable over the years.  
Moreover, Ang (2014) affirms that it is very difficult to identify outperforming mutual funds on a 
consistent basis, concluding that the necessary statistical research is too complicated for the average 
investor. On the other hand, he suggests that the selection can be beneficial to institutional investors with 
the necessary human and computational resources available. Starting from these premises, we report 
some studies that show how, besides considering past returns and mutual funds holdings, the best 
indicators in the selection process are strictly connected to the managers themselves.  
First of all, higher education plays a key role and is a common trait among the most successful managers: 
those who went to the best colleges usually achieve the largest risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, 
standardized tests taken by a large majority of individuals represent another reliable indicator, like the 
SAT exam for the admission to undergraduate programs of universities or colleges. Analyzing the 
personal background of managers substantially improves the selection process and the related portfolio 
performance (Chevalier, 1998).  
Frazzini (2008) introduces an additional relevant variable, showing the close relationship between the 
personal connections of mutual funds managers and their performance in the financial markets. Personal 
connections can influence the managers’ results if they know people working in boards of companies 
they are investing in. The main result of this paper is that connections matter and selecting a manager 
with many significant relations can increase the chances of achieving higher returns. The author measures 
managers’ personal connection by checking if they went to the same college of board members. The 
conclusion of the author highlights again the importance of conducting in-depth research on the managers 
and not just on their performance.  
Notwithstanding, Ang (2014) summarizes these findings by indicating that, even accounting for all these 
measures, selecting outperforming managers remains a challenging task. Furthermore, he states that “the 




of transferring the gains to their investors. The 40-Act provision of symmetrical performance fees56 is 
considered inefficient by Ang (2014) in reducing this distortion, since the great majority of mutual funds 
have adapted their fee structure linking most of the revenue to the asset under management and not to 
the performance. This complication has more consequences on the most talented managers and makes 
the identification and selection process even more difficult. Investors face the risk that, even if they 
manage to carefully choose high-performing funds, their asset under management might grow in 
dimension over the course of the years and gradually lower the returns. The mutual funds industry is in 
fact characterized by decreasing returns to scale (Berk, 2004).  
In the next section we describe two biases that must be taken into consideration during the statistical 
analysis of mutual funds returns. 
5.5    Selection Bias and Survivor Bias  
Most of the studies on mutual funds returns are exposed to the following two biases: selection and 
survivor bias. Our analysis is not an exception, however the effects of both biases on our sample can be 
disregarded as not particularly significant due to the strict constraints that we have imposed on the fund 
selection process. In particular, no relevant differences would have been produced including corrections 
for the biases since our sample is already a subgroup of the entire universe of managers. Moreover, we 
are drawing conclusions only within the range of the high tail of the distribution of mutual funds returns 
and not to the entire group57.  
The selection bias arises when a proper randomization of input data is not realized, leading to incorrect 
inferences because the sample is not representative of the population. In the case of mutual funds the 
effect can be particularly relevant and impossible to avoid, since the common strategy for some families 
of mutual funds is to bring them to market after an evaluation period in which the funds are private and 
not available to the public. If the funds turn out to be successful and capable of attracting enough interest 
on the investors’ side, the private incubation period ends and the funds are marketed. The bias arises 
from the fact that the trial process is only adopted by a share of mutual funds families, estimated by 
Evans (2009) at 23% of the market: the distortion would not happen if all or none of the funds were 
subjects to the evaluation period, creating a homogeneous population. The remaining three quarters of 
the funds are instead immediately available to public subscription. As Ang (2014) underlines, the 
 
56 With symmetrical performance fees the managers earn or lose a certain percentage depending on their results relative 
to the benchmark. 
57 Our sample, in fact, would have not been random due to the constraints imposed. 
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consequence of these different initiation processes is that opened funds are subject to selection bias. The 
effect of this distortion on the returns is to enhance the performance of the funds examined in research, 
because low-performing funds are terminated before being brought to the market. Evans (2009) shows 
that the consequences of the selection can be mitigated by filtering funds for longevity and ticker date 
creation.  
The survivor bias, instead, has a wider and potentially more severe impact on inferences drawn on funds 
population if proper statistical corrections are not included in the analysis. This distortion is due to the 
exclusion of funds that disappear during the period examined because of failure or, less often, because 
of merger with other funds. Ang (2014) reports the example of Janus Worldwide and Janus Global 
Research: the merger between the two funds was conducted to make the combined fund inheriting only 
the performance of the best fund, while the worst one simply vanished. This strategy of closing or 
merging bad performing funds is widely followed by funds management companies, in order to improve 
the overall results of their entire family of marketed funds. Low returns simply disappear because the 
worst funds are merged or liquidated and not reported anymore.  
The effect of the survivor bias, as well as the selection bias, is to enhance funds return and lead to 
inaccurate inferences on the fund population. The upward bias on funds returns is consistent and Carhart 
(2002) estimates a 3.7% difference in the risk-adjusted performance of live and dissolved funds. The bias 
can be mitigated by including the dead funds into the original database. In our research, however, the 
focus was already restricted to top managers only and the inclusion of dead funds in the initial pool of 
funds would have not changed our selection, given the high-performance constraint imposed. Moreover, 
funds that failed were obviously not run by successful or skilled managers and are therefore excluded ex 
ante from our focus on top performers only.   
Overall, the recognition of the selection bias and the survivor bias has a critical importance in the 
evaluation of the results of statistical analysis, since their effects can lead to flawed inferences and 
inaccurate conclusions.  
In the next section we summarize, based on all the complications and concerns discussed in the chapter, 






5.6    Conclusions 
The selection of skilled managers is, indeed, a complicated process that requires appropriate resources 
to be effective. Average investors typically don’t have access to these extensive resources and, even if it 
was the case, they would still be left with some degree of uncertainty.  
A further consideration regards the fee structure of funds which traditionally includes an entry fee, 
operating annual expenses,58 and an exit fee59. The presence of entry and exit fees introduces another 
element in the investing process: the amount of fixed costs that investors sustain as soon as they destinate 
their money to mutual funds. To attract more money, some funds have started waiving their one-time 
entry and exit fees and are known as “no-load funds.” However, for investors these fixed costs represent 
an additional constraint on the possibility of switching to another fund if the former performance is not 
satisfactory enough.  
Institutional investors, on the other hand, are usually entitled with special agreement and lower fees due 
to the large amount of assets that they administrate. The different expertise and resources make the 
selection of skilled managers less complicated for institutional investors who, however, are still subject 
to all the risks and concerns analyzed before and must take adequate countermeasures. Actively managed 
funds seem to be more suitable for institutional investors than retail investors, who can be better off 
destinating their money to passive funds. This conclusion is reinforced by the problems highlighted in 
the present chapter and is reached also by Ang (2014). In support to this point, the author reports that, 
even if fees have been following a downward trend starting from the 90’s, their amount is still relevant 
and most benefits of mutual funds are captured by the managers themselves with their large 
compensation. Furthermore, other hidden costs such as trading costs60 further shrink the returns achieved 
by mutual fund managers. Their impact increases with turnover ratios, so active funds are particularly 
subject to hidden costs and higher fees, further reducing their attractiveness for individual investors.  
Ang (2014) remarks that for most retail investors the results achieved by destinating their savings to 
mutual funds is to tie or, more often, underperform the market benchmark. Skillful active managers are 
the final beneficiaries of their abilities, through the collection of fees and high operating expenses. 
 
58 The typical operating expenses cover management fees, performance fees, and other expenses like legal, administrative, 
marketing and advertising costs. 
59 Entry and exit fees are also referred to as front-load and back-load charges. 
60 Especially commissions and bid-ask spreads. 
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Disregarding the chances of achieving returns above the market, passive funds represent a good 
alternative to retail investors pursuing a fee-reducing strategy.  
In this context, the introduction and progressive expansion of Smart Beta funds can, however, have a 
positive role in the diversification of the portfolio for retail investors. The characteristics shared among 
passive and active funds make them good candidates for the allocation of a small percentage of investors’ 
savings, in spite of the aforementioned risks connected to crowding and the possible future reduction of 
risk premiums. Alford (2016) shows that the interest raised by Smart Beta funds is not backed yet by an 
equivalent share of funds allocated to these strategies. He suggests that the modest allocation is mainly 
due to the fact that, even if their discovery dates back to many decades ago, Smart Beta funds are still 
relatively new in the mutual fund industry. The author concludes by highlighting that the overall trend 
of factor investing seems to be stable and he expects the increase in popularity to continue, even with 
shrinking returns.  
Concluding, if average investors don’t have the ability and knowledge to conduct appropriate and 
accurate research into the managers’ performance and personal background, they can have better results, 
on average, by allocating their money to passive funds and adding a small portion of Smart Beta strategies 
to their holdings. On the other hand, institutional investors competent in selecting skillful active 
managers can take advantage of their resources and add all the different types of funds (active, passive 
and Smart Beta strategies) to their portfolio, depending on their risk aversion and investment targets. 
In the next and last part we summarize the results and review the findings of our paper, making also some 







The main result of the thesis is that only 60% of the top 1% of the fund managers in our sample, which 
is 0.60% of the universe of managers, are able to reach a performance that can only be explained by 
attributing it to their skills. Hence, only these talented mutual fund managers deserve their fees. They 
generate Alpha returns significantly different from zero and are able to transfer an average annual net 
Alpha return of 3.98% to their investors.  
Our findings are in line with Fama and French’s (2010) conclusion on the skills of the managers that 
achieved top returns and that belong to the high tail of the distribution of mutual funds returns. More 
specifically, in our analysis the managers are selected from the top 1% of the distribution of 5001 funds. 
However, our research also shows that the remaining 40% of the managers from the first percentile of 
the distribution achieve positive Alphas, but they are not significant enough to be considered different 
from zero in the respective T-tests. Furthermore, it must be remember than the large majority of 
managers, estimated between 60% and 80% depending on the time period, couldn’t even beat the S&P 
500 benchmark. This observation raises a further question: how is it possible to determine a-priori if a 
manager is skilled, without fully relying on the measurement of past performance? The majority of the 
studies on this topic head toward an in-depth analysis of the manager’s personal background, education 
and connections as the best alternative solution to select skillful managers.  
Furthermore, we point out that the evaluation and selection process is too complicated for the average 
investor, who doesn’t have the necessary resources and knowledge to handle the complexity of the 
statistical analysis. Our conclusion is that the average investor would be better off avoiding active funds 
and investing instead her holdings in passive funds. We also consider that the new Smart Beta funds can 
provide an excellent alternative to passive holdings for a small portion of the wealth of retail investors, 
with the percentage devoted to Smart Beta strategies depending on the personal targets and risk aversion 
of each individual. On the other hand, institutional investors with all the resources available to 
successfully identify skilled managers should take advantage of this ability by investing also in active 
funds. 
Another relevant aspect discussed in the thesis is the determination of the investment style of the selected 
mutual fund managers. We have used six factor indexes to understand whether the manager’s 
performance was simply based on the exposure to the factors or whether a substantial skill component 




about 76% of the weight allocated to the High Quality Index, 13% to the Dividend Yield Index and 
almost 10% to the Low Volatility Index. The remaining factors (Size, Value and Momentum) didn’t have 
a relevant role in the identification of most style portfolios.  
Additionally, we investigated if the risk premiums connected to the six factors are likely to persist in the 
future as a compensation to the investors for bearing the related risks or not, especially in light of the 
recent rise of Smart Beta funds. Our conclusion is that crowding will play a relevant role in the future, 
shrinking the returns but not up to the point of their disappearance because factor investing entails the 
exposure to peculiar risks that not all investors are willing to bear.  
Coming back to our main analysis, some adjustments and improvements can be made to further 
investigate the critical aspects highlighted in the research. For example, some of the constraints can be 
relaxed, allowing managers to allocate their funds to a wider range of financial instruments outside of 
S&P 500 stocks, like corporate and government bonds, derivatives, and other currencies. Furthermore, 
factor indexes can be constructed with alternative criteria, choosing different variables and indicators 
with respect to ours and those reported in previous studies. Advanced statistical tools can also be used to 
assess the impact of statistical biases and to investigate the precise influence of luck on the 40% of 
successful managers who are not deemed to be skillful even if they have achieved positive Alphas. For 
example, adapting the RBSA to a dynamic process able to adjust the style portfolio quickly and more 
effectively to changes in the fund’s holdings and strategy could be a valuable improvement, especially 
if managers have a very dynamic factor exposure.  
Furthermore, another possibility is to integrate and compare different performance measurement models, 
such as the Brinson-Fachler model which provides the setting to calculate the manager’s contribution to 
the returns in three sections: allocation, selection and interaction (Brinson, 1986). More specifically, the 
Brinson-Fachler model assesses the impact on the active return of each manager’s allocation choice 
(overweighting or underweighting a sector included in the benchmark), her stock picking ability in 
selecting securities outside the benchmark and the combined effect of these decisions. The integration of 
the results of this model with our Return-Based Style Analysis may lead to some improvements in the 
identification of skilled managers, together with the additional filter provided by the information on the 
manager’s personal background and private connections.  
In conclusion, our research has determined that among the most successful mutual fund managers only 
a portion of them, 60% of the 1% of the universe, deserves their fees and is capable of granting positive 
Alpha returns to the investors. On the other hand, our results have also highlighted that the selection 
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process of skilled managers is complicated and exposes the average investor to the risk of allocating her 
money to active funds that require the payment of large fees and may not outperform the benchmark on 
a consistent basis. The inclusion of additional information and variables, together with the 
aforementioned improvements in the statistical model, could provide further insights in the identification 








Aharon, D. & Yagil, Y. (2019) The Impact of Financial Leverage on the Variance of Stock Returns. 
International Journal of Financial Studies, 1-18. 
Alford, A. W. (2016). Building Confidence in Smart Beta Equity Strategies. Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management, Quantitative Investment Strategies. 
Ang, A. & Bekaert, G. (2007), Stock return predictability: Is it there? Review of Financial Studies, 651-
707. 
Ang, A. (2014). Asset Management: A Systematic Approach to Factor Investing. Oxford University 
Press, 95-107, 197-220, 442-480, 540-544. 
Ang, A., Hogan, K. & Peterson, J. (2018). Exploring a Fundamental Question in Factor Investing. 
Investment and Wealth Institute, Investment and Wealth Monitor. 
Arnott, R. et all. (2016) How Can “Smart Beta” Go Horribly Wrong? Research Affiliates. 
Arnott, R., Hsu, J. & Moore, P. (2005). Fundamental Indexation. Financial Analysts Journal, 61-97. 
Asness, C. S., Moskowitz, T. J. & Pederssen, L. H. (2013). Value and Momentum Everywhere. Journal 
of Finance, 929-985. 
Baker, M., Bradley, B. & Wurgler, J. (2011). Benchmarks as Limits to Arbitrage: Understanding the 
Low-Volatility Anomaly. Financial Analysts Journal, 1-15. 
Baker, N. L. & Haugen, R. A. (2012). Low Risk Stocks Outperform within All Observable Markets of 
the World. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
Banz, R. W. (1981). The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common Securities. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 3-18. 
Basu, S. (1977). Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios: 
a Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Journal of Finance, 663-682. 
Basu, S. (1982). The Relationship Between Earnings' Yield, Market Value and Return for NYSE 
Common Stocks: Further Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, 129-156. 
Beck, N., Hsu J., Kalesnik V. & Kostka, H. (2016). Will Your Factor Deliver? An Examination of Factor 




Bender, J. et all. (2010). Portfolio of Risk Premia: A New Approach to Diversification. The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 17-25. 
Bender, J. et all. (2013). Foundations of Factor Investing, MSCI Research. 
Berk, J. B. & Green, R. C. (2004) Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets, Journal of 
Political Economy, 1269–1295. 
Berkin, A. L. & Swedroe, L. E. (2016), Your Complete Guide to Factor-Based Investing: The Way Smart 
Money Invests Today. Buckingham Research. 
Bikhchandani, S. & Sharma, S. (2000). Herd Behavior in Financial Markets: A Review. IMF Working 
Paper. 
Black F. and Litterman R. (1991). Asset Allocation Combining Investor Views with Market Equilibrium. 
Journal of Fixed Income, 11-18. 
Black F. and Litterman R. (1992). Global Portfolio Optimization, Financial Analysts Journal, 30-35. 
Black, F. & Scholes, M. (1974). The Effects of Dividend Yield and Dividend Policy on Common Stock 
Prices and Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 1-22. 
Blitz, D. & Van Vliet, P. (2007). The Volatility Effect: Lower Risk Without Lower Return. Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 102-113. 
Blitz, D. (2016). Factor Investing with Smart Beta Indices, Journal of Index Investing, 43-48. 
Blitz, D., Van Vliet, P. & Baltussen, G. (2019). The Volatility Effect Revisited. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Quantitative Special Issue. 
Blume, M. E. (1980). Stock Returns and Dividend Yields: Some More Evidence. Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 567-577. 
Brinson, G. P., Hood, R. L. & Beebower, G. L. (1986). Determinants of Portfolio Performance. Financial 
Analyst Journal, 39-44. 
Buetow, G. & Henderson, B. (2012). An Empirical Analysis of Exchange-Traded Funds. Journal of 
Portfolio Management. 112-127. 
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance, 57-82. 
Carhart, M. M. et all. (2002). Mutual Fund Survivorship. Review of Financial Studies, 1439–1463. 
80 
Chevalier, J. & Ellison, G. (1998). Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers. National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Chow, T. et all. (2011). A Survey of Alternative Equity Index Strategies. Financial Analysts Journal, 
37-57. 
Doskov, N., Pekkala, T. & Ribeiro, R. (2016). Tradable Aggregate Risk Factors and the Cross-Section 
of Stock Returns. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
Evans, R. B. (2010). Mutual Fund Incubation. Journal of Finance, 1581–1611. 
Fama, E. & French, K. (1993) Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3-56. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (1988). Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3-25. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (1992). The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 
427-465. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (2010). Luck versus Skill in the Cross‐Section of Mutual Fund Returns. 
Journal of Finance, 1915-1947. 
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (2014). A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 1-22. 
Frazzini, A. & Cohen, L. (2008). Economic Links and Predictable Returns. Journal of Finance, 1977-
2011. 
Frazzini, A. & Pedersen, L. H. (2014). Betting Against Beta. Journal of Financial Economics, 1-25. 
Gittelson, J. (2019). End of Era: Passive Equity Funds Surpass Active in Epic Shift. Bloomberg. 
Grinold, R. C. and Kahn, R. N. (1995). Active Portfolio Management: Quantitative Theory and 
Applications. Irwin, 87-109. 
Gupta, V. V. (2015). Beyond Smart Beta: Smart Alpha, Arthveda Capital, Asset Management Research. 





Haugen, R. A. & Baker, N. L. (1991). The Efficient Market Inefficiency of Capitalization-Weighted 
Stock Portfolios. Journal of Portfolio Management, 35-40. 
Haugen, R. A. & Heins, J. A. (1972). On the Evidence Supporting the Existence of Risk Premiums in 
the Capital Market. Wisconsin Working Paper. 
Invesco Associates. (2017) Understanding Smart Beta. Invesco Research, Invesco Distributors, Inc. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64, retrieved May 2020. 
Jagannathan, R. & Ma, T. (2003). Risk reduction in large portfolios: Why imposing the wrong constraint 
helps. Journal of Finance, 1651–1683. 
Jegadeesh, N. & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for 
Stock Market Efficiency. Journal of Finance, 65-91. 
Jegadeesh, N. & Titman. (2001). S. Profitability of Momentum Strategies: an Evaluation of Alternative 
Explanations. Journal of Finance, 699-720. 
Karcescki, J. (2002), Returns-Chasing Behavior, Mutual Funds, and Beta's Death. The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 559-594. 
Li, F. et all. (2019). Transaction Costs of Factor Investing Strategies. Financial Analyst Journal, 62-78. 
Lucas, L. & Riepe, M. W. (1996). The Role of Returns-Based Style Analysis: Understanding, 
Implementing, and Interpreting the Technique, Ibbotson Associates, Inc. 
Malkiel, B. G. (2016). A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Time-Tested Strategy for Successful 
Investing, 12th Edition, W. W. Norton & Company, 178-187. 
Markov, M., Mottl, V. & Muchnik, I. (2004). Dynamic Style Analysis and Applications, SSRN Electronic 
Journal. 
McCullough, A. (2019). 2018 Morningstar Fee Study Finds That Fund Prices Continue to Decline. 
Morningstar. 
MSCI (2017). MSCI Barra Factor Indexes Methodology. MSCI Research. 
MSCI Affiliates. (2016). Introduction to Factor Investing. MSCI Research, MSCI Inc. 
Novy-Marx, R. (2012), The Other Side of Value: The Gross Profitability Premium. NBER Working 
Paper No. 15940. 
82 
Otten, R. & Bams, D. (2000). Statistical Tests for Return-Based Style Analysis, Working Paper, 
Maastricht University. 
Reid, P. & Van der Zwan, M. (2019). An Introduction to Alternative Risk Premia. Investment Insight, 
Morgan Stanley Investment Management. 
Root, A. (2020). Market Experts Say Stocks Are Too Expensive. Here’s How to Know if They Are. 
Barron’s Investing, Investment Management Research. 
Rosenberg, B. & Marathe, V. (1976). Common Factors in Security Returns: Microeconomic 
Determinants and Macroeconomic Correlates. Research Program in Finance, University of California 
at Berkeley. 
Rosenberg, B., Reid, K. & Lanstein, R. (1985). Persuasive Evidence of Market Inefficiency. Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 9-17. 
Ross, S. A. (1976), The Arbitrage Theory Of Capital Asset Pricing. Journal of Economic Theory, 341-
360. 
Sebastian, M. & Attaluri, S. (2016). Factor Investing and Adaptive Skill: 10 Observations on Rules-
Based Equity Strategies. Journal of Investing, 95-102. 
SEC Rule 156, 17 CFR § 230.156, retrieved May 2020. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1964), Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk. 
Journal of Finance, 425-442. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1988). Determining a Fund's Effective Asset Mix, Investment Management Review, 59-
69. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1992). Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement. The Journal 
of Portfolio Management, 7-19. 
Sloan, R. (1996). Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future 
Earnings? The Accounting Review, 289-315. 
Soe, A. M. (2014). SPIVA U.S. Scorecard. S&P Dow Jones Indices, McGraw Hill Financial. 
Stewart, J. B. (2017). An Index-Fund Evangelist Is Straying From His Gospel. The New York Times, 




Taleb, N. N. (2007). The B lack Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 
57-60. 
Thomas, S., Mason, A. & McGroarty, F. J. (2010). Returns Based Style Groups and Benchmarking. 
Centre for Asset Management Research, Cass Business School. 
Van der Sluis, P. J. & Swinkels, L. A. P. (2006). Return-Based Style Analysis with Time-Varying 
Exposures. European Journal of Finance, 529-552. 
Vogel, J. (2016). Is the Low Volatility Anomaly Driven by Lottery Demand? Research Insights. 









Table 1.1 – Coefficients of the Regression 
 
 
DTMGX COPLX CAMOX DAVPX DGAGX DRIPX
Intercept 0.00215 0.00492 0.00593 0.0061 0.00322 0.00533
Dividend Yield 0.10322 0.05237 0.24353 0.09287 0.10184 0.13838
Volatility 0.15426 0.25962 0.04581 0.12128 0.14929 0.12108
Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality 0.74037 0.68039 0.70473 0.77975 0.74565 0.7352
Momentum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Size 0 0 0 0 0 0
BHBFX FRSGX FRDPX SRVEX GVEQX HAIAX
Intercept 0.00502 0.01282 0.00912 0.00663 0.00421 0.00566
Dividend Yield 0.17907 0.19238 0.15922 0.10951 0.08951 0.11397
Volatility 0.14103 0 0.20372 0.14439 0.10889 0.13779
Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality 0.67488 0.7948 0.62795 0.73946 0.79738 0.74258
Momentum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Size 0 0 0 0 0 0
JENSX LOMAX MFOCX MINVX MONTX PIODX
Intercept 0.00915 0.00283 0.00797 0.00636 0.01169 0.00495
Dividend Yield 0.19605 0.14744 0.14532 0.17709 0.14655 0.1039
Volatility 0.11614 0.17122 0.03486 0.10244 0 0.12603
Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality 0.67866 0.6785 0.81185 0.7141 0.84176 0.76511
Momentum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Size 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 1.1 – Coefficients of the Regression (Continuation) 
  
PROVX PTWAX RYLIX SENCX SGFFX STFGX
Intercept 0.00671 0.00974 0.00355 0.00718 0.00376 0.00449
Dividend Yield 0.04731 0.17502 0.27768 0.10944 0.08221 0.06317
Volatility 0.08511 0.14408 0.03108 0.16395 0.03705 0.13695
Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality 0.86087 0.67116 0.68769 0.71942 0.87699 0.79539
Momentum 0 0 0 0 0 0
Size 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOCQX VALSX VPMCX USBOX WMKGX PDFDX
Intercept 0.00876 0.01469 0.01528 0.00349 0.00721 0.01028
Dividend Yield 0.11778 0.19821 0.05878 0.14124 0.07523 0
Volatility 0.15894 0.01507 0.08206 0.05872 0.16428 0
Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
High Quality 0.71452 0.77203 0.84388 0.79656 0.75328 0.98972
Momentum 0 0 0 0 0 0




Table 1.2 – Funds Performances and Fees 
 
DTMGX COPLX CAMOX DAVPX DGAGX DRIPX
Alpha (Annualized) 2.53% 3.86% 3.78% 4.05% 2.99% 3.75%
Fees 1.20% 2.69% 0.75% 0.89% 0.90% 0.72%
Net Alpha to Investors 1.33% 1.17% 3.03% 3.16% 2.09% 3.03%
T-Test 1.368 1.715 1.900 2.231 1.607 2.020
BHBFX FRSGX FRDPX SRVEX GVEQX HAIAX
Alpha (Annualized) 3.53% 6.41% 5.33% 4.05% 3.25% 3.92%
Fees 0.95% 0.91% 0.87% 1.08% 0.89% 0.74%
Net Alpha to Investors 2.58% 5.50% 4.46% 2.97% 2.36% 3.18%
T-Test 1.848 2.567 2.846 2.160 1.793 2.102
JENSX LOMAX MFOCX MINVX MONTX PIODX
Alpha (Annualized) 5.24% 2.94% 4.63% 3.99% 5.82% 3.60%
Fees 0.87% 0.71% 1.04% 0.95% 1.39% 0.96%
Net Alpha to Investors 4.37% 2.23% 3.59% 3.04% 4.43% 2.64%
T-Test 2.657 1.624 2.265 2.119 2.340 2.001
PROVX PTWAX RYLIX SENCX SGFFX STFGX
Alpha (Annualized) 4.69% 5.36% 2.77% 4.56% 3.15% 3.38%
Fees 1.00% 1.22% 1.46% 1.02% 2.10% 0.12%
Net Alpha to Investors 3.69% 4.14% 1.31% 3.54% 1.05% 3.26%
T-Test 1.707 2.545 1.269 2.497 1.447 1.805
TOCQX VALSX VPMCX USBOX WMKGX PDFDX
Alpha (Annualized) 5.16% 7.31% 7.67% 2.96% 4.55% 5.41%
Fees 1.25% 1.20% 0.38% 1.25% 1.15% 2.50%
Net Alpha to Investors 3.91% 6.11% 7.29% 1.71% 3.40% 2.91%
T-Test 2.700 3.444 3.817 1.407 2.142 2.076
